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The public debate on Research and Development in the business enterprise sector has seen
arguments that business R&D intensity is low in the Netherlands, and, moreover, that firms
relocate R&D operations from the Netherlands to foreign sites. This study analyses the R&D
location behaviour of Dutch and foreign firms present in the Netherlands, the factors that
determine the R&D location decision, the quality of those R&D location factors in the
Netherlands, and the scope for public policy to improve upon those factors.
The authors want to thank the R&D managers and R&D experts they interviewed for allocating
time and enthusiasm for this project. They appreciate feedback from their interviewees, from
representatives of ministries, from government agencies, from seminar participants, and from
colleagues at CPB. Eduard de Visser (Ernst & Young International Location Advisory Services)
kindly provided the data that support part of the analysis in section 3.4.
This work is co-financed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, the
Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, and the Ministry
of Finance.
F.J.H. Don
Director of CPB 
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1 See, e.g., Snijders (1998a and 1998b), Verspagen and Hollanders (1998), and the discussion in the Dutch Lower
House (February 2, 2000, Lower House document 44290).
2 We use the adjective ‘Dutch-owned’ for companies headquartered in the Netherlands, and ‘foreign-owned’ for
companies with operations but without a headquarter in the Netherlands.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a lively debate on Research and Development (R&D) in the business
sector in the Netherlands.
1 Private R&D investments are said to be relatively low in the
Netherlands. Moreover, it is argued that the trend is negative: firms relocate R&D facilities from
the Netherlands to other countries. Since domestic R&D is an important engine for local
productivity growth, such a trend could be a reason for public concern and for public policy
initiatives in the Netherlands.
This study analyses these arguments:
• Do firms relocate R&D activities from the Netherlands to other countries? Do Dutch-owned
2
companies differ from foreign-owned companies in this respect?
• Is the Netherlands an attractive location for business R&D? What are the decisive location
factors for R&D and what is the quality of these factors in the Netherlands compared to other
countries?
• What is the scope for public policy in this field?
Our findings are the following:
• Firms continuously restructure their R&D operations in terms of size and subject, but the
mortality of R&D locations is low. Once established, R&D sites tend to continue to exist.
• History is an important determinant of the location of R&D, since firms typically co-locate new
R&D operations with existing non-R&D activities or expand existing R&D facilities.
• Decisive location factors for R&D (in addition to history) are the supply of qualified researchers
and the quality of the public knowledge infrastructure, including the knowledge transfer
between science and industry.
• A benchmark study of R&D location factors (apart from history) reveals that the Netherlands
takes an average or higher position in a ranking of OECD countries according to R&D
attractiveness. The size of the R&D labour force in the Netherlands lags behind those in a group
of leading countries. The quality of the Dutch public knowledge infrastructure is relatively high.
Indicators are inconclusive about the quality of the science-industry knowledge transfer.
• Actual R&D location decisions show that firms neither strongly favour nor strongly disfavour
the Netherlands as a location for R&D relative to other European countries.
• The rationale for (more intensive) public policy that fosters the location of Dutch- and foreign-
owned R&D in the Netherlands is strong, since the social return to a unit domestic R&D is 
3 See Verbruggen (2000) for an extensive description of the database. A list of top R&D spenders is available from
the internet at http://www.cpb.nl/nl/general/org/afdelingen/ti/research/
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larger than the social return to a unit R&D in a foreign country, and since the social returns to
R&D exceed the private returns. This strong rationale does not necessarily imply that policy
initiatives are always effective and efficient: the elasticities and the social (opportunity) costs
should be taken into account.
The empirical evidence supporting these findings is drawn from a number of sources:
• The CPB company R&D database. This database provides quantitative and qualitative
information on R&D activities of a large number of enterprises operating in the Netherlands.
3 
Quantitative R&D data are available for 130 small and large Dutch- and foreign-owned
companies. These firms account for a lion’s share of business R&D performed in the
Netherlands. However, a few active R&D players are missing because they do not publish
information on R&D. The scope of the database is confined to R&D, so data on ‘innovation’ are
absent.
• Interviews with R&D managers and other experts. We conducted a number of interviews in
order to discuss the issues raised in this paper with field experts. We interviewed eight R&D
managers of Dutch multinationals and foreign R&D-intensive companies operating in the
Netherlands. These companies represent nearly 70% of Dutch R&D by Dutch-owned companies
and about 15% of all foreign-owned R&D in the Netherlands. They are active mainly in
electronics and chemicals. We also interviewed six experts from academia, government,
employers’ organizations, and location consultancy firms. Interviews were held from August to
December 2000.
• Various data sets are used to compare R&D location factors in the Netherlands with those in
other countries. We pooled own calculations with indicators presented by other authors.
• An international data set on foreign direct R&D investment projects provided by Ernst & Young,
a location consultancy firm.
• The international empirical literature on (the location of) R&D (in the Netherlands).
The study is structured as follows. First, we describe the trends in business R&D in the
Netherlands over the past 25 years and we find out whether or not firms relocate R&D from the
Netherlands to other countries (section 2). Next, we discuss the decisive location factors for R&D
and we benchmark the Netherlands against other countries on these factors (section 3). Then,
we turn to the rationale for R&D location policy and we set out the benefits and opportunity
costs of some policy options (section 4). Finally, we summarize our findings (section 5). 
9
2 R&D location in the Netherlands, 1975-2000
2.1 Introduction
What trends do we observe in the location of R&D by companies with operations in the
Netherlands? How does the structure and size of Dutch business R&D change through the
years? And what trends do we observe at the firm-level? In particular, do companies
headquartered in the Netherlands re-locate R&D to other countries? And do foreign companies
locate many R&D activities in the Netherlands?
Section 2.2 analyses the aggregate R&D structure in the Netherlands. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 focus
on developments in Dutch R&D by individual Dutch-owned and foreign-owned companies
respectively. Section 2.5 concludes. The empirical analysis draws heavily on the CPB company
R&D database.
2.2 Structure and size of company R&D
What are the trends in aggregate business R&D in the Netherlands? Has size and structure
changed through the years? We capture the main characteristics of company R&D in the
Netherlands, with particular attention to the larger R&D spenders.
The macro picture
R&d intensity measured as business R&D expenditure as a share of GDP is relatively small in
the Netherlands, see figures 2.1 and 2.2 . The Netherlands lags behind the large OECD
economies and the Scandinavian economies. R&D intensity in the Netherlands rose to 1.3% of
GDP throughout the 1980s, declined towards 0.9% in 1992, and was back at 1.1% in 1999. The
share of OECD R&D performed in the Netherlands (an alternative indicator measuring the
‘R&D market share’) experienced a similar roller coaster ride: up to 1.4% in 1987, down to 1.0%
in 1992, and back to 1.2% in 1999. In sum, business R&D in the Netherlands came back from
the low level in the beginning of the 1990s, but is still small relative to the large OECD
economies and to Scandinavia. 
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Figure 2.1   Business R&D expenditure in large OECD economies and in the Netherlands, as a share of GDP
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators.
Figure 2.2  Business R&D expenditure in medium-sized OECD economies, as a share of GDP
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators. 
4 Dfl = Dutch guilders. One Dutch guilders is about 0.45 euro.
5 This picture of the aggregated structure of business R&D in the Netherlands is based on the CPB company
database rather than the official R&D statistics published by Statistics Netherlands. Smaller R&D companies are
included in the aggregates presented here. The latest year of observation is 1999 on average.
6 Studies have shown that the higher R&D (or innovation) expenditures, in general the higher also R&D intensity,
measured as R&D as percentage of turnover or R&D per employee. See for instance, Cantwell and Janne (1999),
and CBS (1999, pp.270-171).
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Top R&D spenders in the Netherlands
Table 2.1 presents Dutch-owned companies each spending recently more than Dfl 25 million on
R&D in the Netherlands, and Table 2.2 shows foreign affiliates in the Netherlands with Dutch
R&D amounting to more than Dfl 10 million.
4 Total 1999 Dutch R&D spending by the 130
companies covered in the CPB database was Dfl 8,3 billion.
5 Dutch-owned companies spent
much more on R&D than foreign-owned companies.
6 The 23 Dutch-owned companies listed in
Table 2.1 account for nearly three quarters of total company R&D in the Netherlands, while the
share of the 29 foreign affiliates reported in Table 2.2 is about one fifth. Together, the 52 big
R&D spenders explain 94% of R&D spending by all 130 companies. Philips, the Dutch
electronics giant, dominates all other firms with its share of more than one quarter in Dutch
R&D. 
12
Table 2.1 R&D effort in the Netherlands by Dutch-owned companies (R&D expenditures > 25 mln Dfl)





Philips electronics 2000 2336 8683
AKZO Nobel chemicals/pharmaceuticals 2000 869
c 3237 (‘99)
ASM Lithography integrated circuits equipment 2000 519.4
a 1500
DSM chemicals 2000 463 1525
Unilever * food, personal care 2000 350 1400
Shell * oil & gas 2000 346 2101 (‘98)
Océ copiers 2000 250 1075
Stork machinery, engineering 2000 130
a 865
KPN Telecom telecommunication 2000 125.6
a 435
ASM International semi-conductor equipment 2000 81.3
a 60 (‘90)
Advanta seeds 1999 60
a 338
Draka  cables for communication 2000 57.3
a 126
Acordis chemicals 1999 54
a 300
Campina food, biotechnology 2000 53
a 220
Numico food 1998 40
b 200
Toolex optical disc equipment 2000 39
a 121
Twentsche Kabelmij cables for communication 2000 38.7
a
Avebe food 1999 34
a 116 (‘97)
Friesland Coberco food 2000 34
a 85 (‘95)
Aalberts machinery 2000 31
a 100
Vredestein rubber  1989 30
a
Delft Instruments medical instruments 2000 27.2
a 125
Besi machinery 2000 25.2
a 68
Total of the above 23 companies 5993.7
Total of 130 companies in CPB company database 8254.5
Main source: CPB company database, November 2001.
* Unilever and Shell are headquartered in the UK and the Netherlands
a 
Assumption: all R&D is performed in the Netherlands, except for ASM International, Advanta, Draka and Acordis, which are assumed to
perform 50% of their total R&D in the Netherlands.
b 
Basis for calculation R&D is number of R&D employees, multiplied by 200 thousand Dfl, the guesstimated R&D costs per employee in recent
years (The CBS figure for 1997 is 193 thousand Dfl).
c 
Source: Tolsma (2001). 
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Lucent USA telecom equipm. 2001 240
b
1200 
Ericsson SWE telecom equipm. 2000 220
b
1100 
Invensys GBR Baan Company IT services 1999 140
a
805 
Corus GBR Hoogovens basic metals 2000 121 450  (‘01)
Solvay Pharmac. BEL pharmaceuticals 2000 111
b
555 
Medtronic USA Bakken/Vitatron medical instrum. 99/00 92
d
335 
Benteler GER PD&E cars 2000 84
b
420 
ICI GBR Quest chemicals 1999 74.3
a
Dow Chemical USA Dow Benelux chemicals 2000 72 258 
Paccar USA DAF Trucks automobiles 2000 71
b
355 
Thales FRA Thales Nederland military equipm. 2000 70.2
a
Yamanouchi JAP Yaman. Europe pharmaceuticals 2000 50
b
250 
GE Plastics USA chemicals 2000 44
c
205 
Cap Gemini FRA IT services 1992 37.8 189 
Bosch GER V.Doorne’s Trans. machinery 2001 33 120 
SKF SWE metal products 2000 32
b
160 
Johnson&Johnson USA Cordis medical instrum. 1997 31.8 42 (‘95)
Novartis SWI Novartis Seeds pharmaceuticals 1993 30
e
211 
TotalFinaElf FRA Sigma Coatings  chemicals 2000 22
c
140 (‘01)
Wartsila NSD FIN Stork Wartsila machinery 2000 21
a c
89 
Sara Lee/DE USA food 2000 20
b
100 
Glaxo Smith Kline GBR GSK Nederland pharmaceuticals 1998 18.5 80 
Hercules GBR chemicals/biotech 2000 17.2
b
86 
Eli Lilly USA pharmaceuticals 1999 15
c
10 (‘94)
Q8 Petroleum KUW oil 2000 14 54 
Honeywell USA telecom equipm. 1995 12.2 40  (‘93)
Huhtamaki FIN Van Leer  metal products 1998 12
a
Avery Dennison USA chemicals 1990 10 80 





Total of the above 29 companies 1726.0
Total of 130 companies in CPB company database 8254.5
Main source: CPB company database, November 2001.
a
 Signaal and Stork Wartsila are assumed to perform all R&D in the Netherlands, Baan and HVL 50%, Quest 100% of its Food R&D. Nalco
Europe employs 100 people, of which it is assumed half of them do R&D.
b
 Basis for calculation R&D is number of R&D employees, multiplied by 200 thousand Dfl, the guesstimated R&D costs per employee in recent
years (The CBS figure for 1997 is 193 thousand Dfl).
c
 Source: Tolsma (2001). 
d
 Tolsma (2000): Bakken Research = 55 mln Dfl, Tolsma (2001): Vitatron = 35 mln Dfl in 1999. Intermediair Jaarboek (June 2001): R&D
employment of Bakken = 200 (in 2000). On the basis of R&D costs per R&D employee of Bakken, Vitatron’s R&D employment is 135.
e
 In 2000, Zeneca agrochemicals and Novartis agribusiness merged into Syngenta. Novartis Seeds turned into Syngenta Seeds (and Crop
Protection), and Zeneca Mogen (Leiden) became Syngenta Mogen. Mogen spent about 8 mln Dfl in 1999. Dutch R&D by Syngenta Seeds and
Crop Protection is not known. 
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In which sectors?
The largest Dutch-owned R&D firms are primarily active in electronics, chemicals and
pharmaceuticals, and food (table 2.1). Many of the large foreign-owned R&D also operate in
these industries (table 2.2). Does this specialization pattern of foreign R&D firms in the
Netherlands indicate a Dutch comparative advantage in these industries, or does the pattern
simply reflect that the internationalisation of R&D mainly occurs in these industries?
Niosi (1999) provides evidence for the latter thesis, i.e., the internationalisation of R&D is
mainly confined to chemicals and electronics. Patel and Pavit (1998), however, find that patent
data reveal a Dutch comparative advantage in industrial chemicals and electronics, in particular
telecommunication. These advantages decrease somewhat over the past decades. They also show
that a comparative advantage in fine chemicals slipped away in the 1980s. Verspagen and
Hollanders (1998) observe a comparative advantage in ‘other chemicals’ (i.e. not in
pharmaceuticals), oil, and electrical machinery. Kusters and Minne (1992) identify a
specialization in the food industry which is not matched by R&D-intensive foreign investments.
This evidence thus suggests that for some industries foreign R&D investments in the
Netherlands can be attributed to a comparative advantage (e.g., industrial chemicals), while for
other sectors such investments mainly stem from a world-wide trend of R&D
internationalization (e.g., pharmaceuticals). 
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Concentration of Dutch R&D at big companies
A few large multinational companies perform the lion’s share of business R&D in the
Netherlands (see also Hollanders and Verspagen, 1998). The so-called ‘Big Five’ (Philips, Akzo
Nobel, DSM, Unilever and Shell) account for more than half of the aggregate company R&D in
1999. Recently, ASML surpassed Shell, Unilever and DSM in the R&D ranking, and also Océ is
steadily increasing its Dutch R&D over the years. The ‘Big Seven’ R&D firms in the Netherlands
account for 62% of total R&D (Table 2.3).
Table 2.3 shows that the degree of concentration was higher in 1993 than in 1998. Before the
1990s, Dutch R&D was even more concentrated (CBS, 1999, p.89). Hence, the concentration of
R&D has declined gradually in recent years. 

















‘Big Seven’* 7 5133 62 7 3456 4019 68
     - - Of which 'Big Five'* 5 4364 53  5 3250 3779 64
Other Dutch-owned companies 68 1273 15 31 944 1098 19
All Dutch-owned companies 75 6406 78 38 4400 5116 86
     - - Of which above 25 mln, Tab. 2.1 23 5994 73
All foreign-owned companies 55 1848 22 19 690 802 14
    - - Of which above 10 mln, Tab. 2.2 29 1726 21
All companies 130 8255 100 57 5090 5919 100
    - - Of which top R&D spenders 52 7720 94
Number of companies of which R&D
is unknown but supposedly do R&D app. 35 na app. 20 na
Business enterprise R&D (BERD),
official CBS statistics 9227 5749 6685
Dutch domestic product, market
prices (GDP) 823983 581466 676123
R&D of companies as % of GDP 130 1.00 57 0.87 0.87
BERD as % of GDP 1.12 0.98 0.98
* Big Five: Philips, Akzo Nobel, Unilever, Shell, DSM; Big Seven: Big Five plus ASML and Océ.
Sources: 1999: CPB company database, November 2001; CBS press release 14 March 2001, “R&D uitgaven stijgen weer”, provisional figure.
1993: Minne (1995) recalculated with R&D expenditure by Big Seven; OECD (1998b). Nominal values of 1993 are deflated with the price index of
the Dutch domestic product in market prices (CPB, 2001). The price index for 1993 is 0.86 (1999=1). 
7 Note that we do not consider individual companies through the years, but compare the overall R&D structure
and the influence of foreign-owned companies as a whole in this R&D.
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Such high R&D concentration rates do not deviate fundamentally from those in other advanced
economies. Minne (1997) finds that in the first half of the 1990s, the top-10 of R&D spenders in
the US accounted for almost one quarter of the total US business R&D. In Germany, the top-8
accounted for 60% of national R&D. These concentration ratios were only gradually reduced
since then. 
R&D tends to be concentrated at large firms, as these firms are, by their large scale, able to
meet the high fixed costs and risks of research projects. That is, the economies of scale and
scope are large in several field of technology. Furthermore, firm-specific knowledge is
accumulated relatively easily within large firms (Minne, 1997).
Share of foreign-owned R&D increased
Table 2.3 shows that the share of foreign-owned companies in Dutch R&D has increased from
14% to 22% between 1993 and 1999. A substantial part of the increase is due to the wave of
mergers and acquisitions in the 1990s.
7 For example, Corus is the product of a merger between
Hoogovens and British Steel, and is headquartered in the UK. Bosch acquired Van Doorne’s
Transmissie in 1995. Although Bosch was present in the Netherlands already before, it is
supposed to have had no Dutch R&D activity before. Furthermore, ICI took over Quest
International from Unilever in 1997, and DAF Trucks was acquired by Paccar in 1996. These
formerly Dutch-owned companies continued their R&D activity in the Netherlands. The
acquisition of Baan by Invensys (UK) in 2000, and PDE (from Nedcar) by Benteler (Germany)
in 2001, further increased the foreign influence in Dutch R&D.
Comparing the levels of R&D spending in 1993 and 1999
Company R&D activities (in 1999 prices) rose by approximately Dfl 2,3 billion or 40% between
1993 and 1999 (Table 2.3). A part of the increase may be due to a better registration of R&D
activities by companies themselves, particularly by the smaller ones. Besides, the general trends
shown by empirical studies on business R&D indicate that the number of firms conducting
R&D has been increased. Furthermore, also as a percentage of gross domestic product, R&D
efforts increased.
The accelerating R&D efforts of ASML and Océ were about half of the total increase of R&D
by the Big Seven. R&D spending by other Dutch-owned companies increased 16%, even though
several traditionally important R&D firms disappeared from this category because of mergers
and acquisitions by foreign companies. R&D efforts by affiliates of foreign firms in the
Netherlands rose more than twice, partly because of acquisitions of Dutch R&D by foreign
companies. 
8 Turnover or value added in a given year is more sensitive to the business cycle. For a discussion on different
measures, see CBS (1999), pp. 270-271.
9 We assume that the structure of knowledge intensities of domestic and foreign companies did not change a lot
between 1996 and 1999, so that we can (tentatively) compare the 1999 CPB data and the 1996 CBS data.
10 Companies of a number of countries in the R&D database have been left aside, as no data for these countries
were available from CBS (1999). 
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Are foreign affiliates more or less engaged in Dutch R&D than domestic-owned companies?
Hitherto, the absolute size of R&D efforts by both domestic and foreign companies is
scrutinized. We found that Dutch-owned companies spent much more on R&D than foreign-
owned companies do. However, the size of R&D in relation to the size of the business activity of
the company in the Netherlands is probably a better indicator for the engagement of companies
in Dutch R&D.
Table 2.4 summarizes data on average R&D expenditures per company and R&D
expenditures per employee of the 125 companies in the CPB company database. Employment is
used as a proxy for the size of business activity by the company in the Netherlands.
8 In order to
assess the reliability of the R&D data, data on innovation expenditures collected by CBS in the
CIS survey are also presented.
9 We emphasize that innovation expenditures consist of R&D
expenditures for a large part, next to expenditures to among other things marketing and
training.
Like in Table 2.3, we observe from the upper part of Table 2.4 that Dutch-owned companies
spent much more on R&D and knowledge activities than foreign-owned companies did, also
measured as average R&D expenditure per company. However, the data on the relative size of
the R&D activity measured as R&D expenditures of employee show that the differences are
much less large. The data on innovation expenditures confirm this conclusion.
The lower part of Table 2.4 sketches the relative size of R&D and innovation activity by
companies split by country of origin.
10 The countries are ranked according to the relative size of
Dutch R&D by the companies originating from these countries. Swedish companies show the
highest activity, whereas Danish companies rank lowest. Furthermore, American companies
outnumber the other foreign companies, but are just ranking at average in relative size of R&D.
Dutch-owned companies rank fourth. 
Comparing the R&D data with those of the CIS survey, the rankings for Swedish, Belgian,
American, German and Danish companies match well. Due to the small sample size in the R&D
data, outliers can bias the ranking. However, as we noted earlier, innovation expenditures are for
a large part determined by R&D expenditures. Moreover, the R&D sample concerns the largest
R&D spenders, so we do not expect that the ranking would change substantially when the
sample would be complete. The rankings in average expenditures per company according to the
R&D and CIS data also match well.  
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In short, foreign-owned and domestic-owned companies do not differ much in the relative size
of their Dutch R&D or innovation activity. Still, there are pronounced differences depending on
the country of origin of the foreign-owned firms.
Table 2.4 Relative size of Dutch R&D activity of Dutch-owned and foreign-owned companies




























Total 130 8.3 63.5 27.1 2462 10.5 4.3 7.5
Domestic 75 6.4 85.4 27.8 1570 7.7 4.9 7.2
























Sweden 2 126.0 1 78.2 1 35 13.4 1 35.4 1
Belgium 1 111.0 2 71.0 2 61 4.6 4 13.3 3
Japan 3 18.3 8 64.0 3 59 1.3 11 6.5 8
USA 21 30.6 5 28.3 4 226 3.3 7 7.6 6
Netherl. 71 85.4 3 27.8 5 1570 4.9 3 7.2 7
UK 8 46.4 4 20.7 6 121 1.9 8 4.4 10
Germany 5 27.6 6 18.3 7 121 1.7 9 5.6 9
France 6 25.6 7 16.4 8 57 5.0 2 13.9 2
Switzerl. 3 12.5 10 13.7 9 62 3.8 6 9.5 5
Finland 2 16.5 9 6.1 10 16 4.0 5 13.0 4
Denmark 2 3.1 11 4.4 11 12 1.4 10 2.7 11




• 23 Dutch-owned companies and 29 foreign-owned affiliates in the Netherlands account for the
lion’s share of Dutch business R&D spending in 1999.
• Many top R&D spenders, both Dutch-owned and foreign-owned, operate in chemicals and
pharmaceuticals, and in electronics. Food seems to be a Dutch specialisation.
• Dutch business R&D was and is concentrated at a few big companies. The Big Five still account
for half the total business R&D in 1999. Océ and ASML in particular now invest in R&D at a
scale comparable to the Big Five.
• The share of foreign affiliate R&D spending in the Netherlands increased, partly due to
acquisitions of Dutch R&D intensive firms by foreign companies.
• The number of firms devoting substantial amounts of money to R&D grew rapidly.
• Both Dutch-owned and foreign-owned companies increased the absolute level of R&D
investments. This joint increase in R&D spending is also reflected by the increase in R&D
intensity and the increase in R&D market share at the macro level.
• The R&D intensity of foreign-owned and domestic-owned companies in the Netherlands do not
differ strongly.
In sum, the structure of business R&D in the Netherlands did not change strongly during the
1990s. The aggregate level of R&D spending rose considerably. 
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2.3 Do Dutch-owned companies re-locate R&D to foreign countries?
Do Dutch-owned companies favour the Netherlands as the location for R&D? Or do they move
R&D abroad, at the expense of domestic R&D sites? In the current section we study the R&D
location decisions of the ‘Big Seven’: the Big Five multinationals plus ASML and Océ. These
firms together account for more than 60% of total business R&D in the Netherlands in 1999
(see Table 2.3).
Table 2.5 presents an overview of the development in the share of Dutch R&D activity in world-
wide R&D for the Big Seven companies, and Figure 2.1 reveals the development in the (absolute)
level of the Dutch and foreign R&D expenditures of these firms (except for ASML). A
comparison between absolute and relative levels of R&D activity gives an indication of the R&D
strategy of the companies under consideration. Table 2.5 and Figure 2.1 show that, although the
share of Dutch R&D falls for some companies in some years, this is generally due to an
expansion of foreign R&D operations rather than a contraction of Dutch R&D activity. We now
scrutinize these developments firm by firm.
Philips
Philips' Dutch and foreign R&D expenditures followed a similar development up till the early
1990s. From that time on, foreign R&D increased while Dutch R&D decreased. Likely
explanations are the ‘Centurion’ overhaul of the Philips organization and the focus of R&D
towards a few fields of technology (e.g., semi-conductors), as illustrated by the divestment of
R&D intensive subsidiaries such as Signaal and ASML in the Netherlands. However, in the
second half of the 1990s, Dutch R&D expenditures caught up with foreign R&D. Foreign R&D
activity continued to rise (especically in the USA and Asia), but R&D spending in the
Netherlands expanded faster. This recent increase is mainly spurred by the building of a new
Table 2.5 Dutch-owned multinationals: share of Dutch R&D in the company’s world-wide R&D, 1977-2000
1977 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000
Philips 50 46 45 46 36 45 38




Unilever 25 18 21 21 24 22 14
DSM 100 100 100 95 90 77 80
Shell 42 42 27 33 44 36 37
Océ 99 99 98 91 90 67 57
Sources: CPB company database, November 2001. If no data were available for the years under consideration, the nearest years are chosen.
a ASML became independent of Philips in 1991. 
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high tech campus in Eindhoven. In 2000, foreign R&D rose faster than Dutch R&D, but not at
the cost of Dutch R&D. Acquisitions of foreign firms with much R&D activity (ADAC, Agilent),
and the establishment of new R&D laboratoria in China and Bangalore is responsible for the fast
increase in foreign-based R&D. The Dutch campus is still under construction and Dutch R&D
grows slower. Recently, the growth in the R&D-intensive chip industry is slowing down.
However, as many other firms in the business, Philips continues to invest in R&D on
semiconductor and component technologies as long run expectations are more positive.
Akzo Nobel
Akzo Nobel publishes few data on R&D expenditures in the Netherlands. The available data
suggest that foreign and Dutch R&D expenditures go up together harmonically, although there
seems to be a divergence around 1995 (not shown in Figure 2.1). About half of Akzo Nobel's
R&D is conducted at Dutch locations. Recently, Intervet, Akzo Nobel's veterinary drugs
subsidiary, acquired a number of foreign R&D-intensive companies in order to gain market
share. Furthermore, Akzo Nobel divested several business units, e.g. Acordis in 1999, but these
firms typically continued their R&D activities in the Netherlands. Hence, any decline in the
share of R&D expenditures in the Netherlands can not be attributed to a decline in the level of
R&D activity of Akzo Nobel’s (former) business.
DSM
In the mid-1980s, DSM extended the range of fine chemical products in its product portfolio
relative to its activities in basic chemicals. This change of strategy resulted in an increase in R&D
investments, because the new product portfolio required a larger R&D intensity, i.e. comparable
to competitors. The new strategy after 1985 did not consider R&D just as a cost factor, but also
as a means of growth and development of the company (Lintsen and Veraart, 2000, p.106-107).
The second half of the 1990s showed an upheaval in R&D expenditures, this time including a
substantial increase in foreign R&D expenditures. The shift to specialties was intensified, to a
portfolio of high-grade chemical and biotechnological products and high-performance materials.
DSM is currently trying to increase its knowledge for the new portfolio through acquisitions, in
particularly foreign acquisitions. Recently, DSM acquired Catalytica Pharmaceuticals (US). Still,
the trend is not at the expense of the level of R&D operations in the Netherlands (see Figure 2.1).
Recently, Dutch R&D activity even goes upward, probably due to expansion in pharmaceuticals. 
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Figure 2.3   Dutch multinationals: R&D expenditures in the Netherlands and abroad, 1975-2000, 1999 prices
Source: CPB company database, November 2001. Price index based on Dutch domestic product in market prices (CPB, 2001). 
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Océ
Océ expanded its Dutch R&D operations at a high pace throughout the 1970, 80s and 90s.
Substantial growth of foreign R&D, in particularly through acquisitions, started in the 1990s.
The recent shift in demand from analog to digital copiers forced Océ to acquire essential
know-how abroad. The boost in foreign R&D did not restrain the expansion of R&D activity of
Océ in the Netherlands. However, in 2000, a fast increase in foreign-based R&D is observable,
whereas R&D activity in the Netherlands stagnates.
Unilever
Unilever’s Dutch R&D activity decreased from 25% of its world-wide R&D to about 20% during
the period under consideration (Table 2.5). Figure 2.1 shows foreign R&D expenditures increase
a little faster than Unilever's Dutch R&D, and recently Dutch R&D declined. Nevertheless, it
seems as if the Netherlands remain a robust home base for its R&D (together with the UK), as
Dutch R&D employment is steady. How the emergence of the Asian markets will change this
picture, is not predictable, although it is notable that Hindustan Lever (India) currently runs one
of the four core R&D laboratoria of Unilever. The current disposal of a large number of
Unilever's brands may also affect the geographical division of R&D. 
Shell
Since 1985, Shell focussed its business operation at the start of the production chain: production
and processing of basic energy resources. Divestment of a number of R&D intensive chemical
divisions reduced the level of Shell's world-wide R&D. The size of the R&D operations in the
Netherlands also declined. Shell closed down the Billiton laboratory in Arnhem, for example,
and relocated part of its R&D activities to the UK. The reduction of Dutch R&D was relatively
smaller and occurred later than the reduction of world-wide R&D spending.
The fall of Dutch R&D spending at Shell stands in marked contrast with the boost at the five
Dutch multinationals discussed above. Still, the decline of Shell's Dutch R&D operations did not
enhance Shell's foreign R&D.
ASML
Up till now, ASML performed all R&D in the Netherlands. Recently, however, ASML established
and acquired several companies in the US. More importantly, the acquisition of the US Silicon
Valley Group in 2001 will contribute strongly to an increase in the share of R&D of ASML
performed in foreign countries.
Divestments in the Netherlands by the Big Five
In the past 15 years, the Big Five multinationals divested a number of R&D intensive Dutch
subsidiaries, such as ASML, Acordis, and Quest. These businesses either continued life as 
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independent companies or as subsidiaries of other, mainly foreign, enterprises. In general, the
change of ownership did not affect the location of R&D (see also section 2.4). 
Conclusions
We summarize our findings regarding the location of R&D of large Dutch-owned R&D
performing firms:
• For some Big Seven firms the share of R&D located in the Netherlands in total R&D spending
falls. Still, the level of R&D expenditures in the Netherlands grows (except for Unilever). For
other firms, both the level of R&D expenditures and the share of R&D spending in the
Netherlands increases.
• New foreign R&D activities (partially through acquisitions of R&D-intensive foreign firms) by
the large Dutch-owned companies generally came on top of the incumbent R&D activities in the
Netherlands, rather than being at the expense of those R&D activities.
• Divested R&D subsidiaries typically continued the R&D operations at the same location.
• A few Dutch-owned firms with relatively small R&D expenditures also started or acquired Dutch
and foreign R&D labs, the latter typically additional to home-based R&D activities.
In sum, we do not find evidence that Dutch-owned companies relocate R&D to foreign
countries. They typically expand their R&D programmes through R&D investments abroad.
Home-based and foreign-based R&D by other Dutch-owned companies
Table 2.1 suggests that only the biggest Dutch-owned R&D spenders have sizeable foreign R&D activities. Still,
smaller R&D firms also have foreign R&D operations that, moreover, may be important for the company’s
performance despite their relatively small size. For example, KPN operates several small ‘R&D watchtowers' in
Silicon Valley in order to keep in touch with the latest telecom technologies. Another example is Pharming (a biotech
company now in financial difficulties) that moved several R&D operations abroad, possibly in response to public
anxiety towards biotechnology research and biotech patenting. Note that for many firms listed in table 2.1 we do
know that they conduct some R&D in foreign countries, but we do not know the size of these operations. Numico,
a firm with sizeable foreign R&D, expanded its R&D operations in the Netherlands in recent years substantially
(Minne and Rensman, 2001). 
11 The data presented in Table 2.9 are subject to uncertainty.
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2.4 Do the Netherlands attract foreign R&D?
This section analyses foreign-owned R&D investments by the top spenders in the Netherlands
(see Table 2.2). The raw data supporting the discussion have been listed in Table 2.9.
11 
Greenfield and non-greenfield R&D
The economic literature defines two types of R&D investments: greenfield and non-greenfield.
Greenfield R&D investments are ‘newly established stand-alone company facilities mainly active
in physical research, design and development of products, while not being a software
development centre’ (Buck Consultants International, 1999a), i.e. new laboratories build from
scratch on. Non-greenfield R&D investments refer to R&D facilities new to the company, but not
newly established or stand-alone. Examples includes R&D mergers and acquisitions, expansions
of existing R&D facilities, or new R&D facilities co-located to existing non-R&D facilities (e.g.
production, sales and distribution).
Usually start by non-greenfield R&D investment
Table 2.6 reveals that most foreign R&D investment by the foreign-owned top R&D spenders
which were listed in Table 2.2 is non-greenfield. Foreign firms typically start new R&D
operations in the Netherlands through co-location and acquisitions. There seems to be a
watershed around 1980, so we divided history into periods before and after 1980. This is also
parallel to developments in R&D strategy by multinationals, as described by empirical studies
(see for example Research Policy (1999), vol.28(2-3)).
Before 1980
Up till the 1980s, R&D followed production abroad. The internationalization of production
required adaption of product characteristics to local preferences, i.e. foreign R&D. Foreign R&D
Table 2.6 The 28 foreign-owned top R&D spenders: start of R&D in the Netherlands
Type of R&D investment Number of companies




Greenfield 2 2 4
Co-location 8 1 9
Acquisition 1 12 13
Merger 0 2 2
Total 11 17 28
Source: Table 2.9
Note: Of Q8, which is also listed in Table 2.2, we do not know how it started R&D in the Netherlands, so we left it aside in the current table. 
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affiliates in the Netherlands adhere to this picture: new R&D facilities were build close to
existing production facilities in the Netherlands. Over the years, however, the nature of foreign
R&D programme often changed from adaption to creation. The box presents some illustrative
examples of foreign firm establishing new R&D facilities in the Netherlands before 1980.
After 1980
In the period 1980-2000, different strategic motives seem to propel foreign companies to start
R&D activities in the Netherlands. Companies all over the world restructured and focussed their
businesses at core activities in order to reap ‘economies of scale, scope, speed and space'
(Granstrand, 1998). Some activities, including associated R&D, were acquired, others divested.
Indeed, the main way of entry of foreign R&D in the Netherlands in this period is through
acquisition. The data in Table 2.9 suggests that foreign acquisitions of R&D facilities in the
Netherlands were often motivated by strategic reasons unrelated to R&D (e.g. production or
distribution strategy). The following box enumerates some examples.
Examples of R&D-related foreign direct investments before 1980: co-location
Ericsson: emergence of a leading consumer market
Ericsson (Sweden) was one of the first foreign companies investing in the Netherlands. In 1920, it established an
office in Rijen, because of the abundant supply of wood (in Brabant) for telegraph poles. In a later stage, the
company started and gradually extended its R&D programme, starting with applied research. Today, Ericsson
Nederland conducts R&D in telecommunication equipment for the world market. Ericsson’s European ICT center
is located in Enschede. The leading Dutch consumer market for telecommunication is said to have contributed to
the size and quality of Ericsson’s R&D activities in the Netherlands in recent years. 
SKF: concentration of R&D in the Netherlands
SKF (Sweden) is another early foreign starter in the Netherlands. R&D followed sales activities. Today, the company
concentrates corporate R&D in the Engineering Research Centre in Nieuwegein. This research is supported by
manufacturing technology development centres and product development and testing facilities worldwide. We do
not know why SKF decided to concentrate R&D in the Netherlands.
Dow and General Electric Plastics: physical infrastructure and location
General Electric Plastics (US) established its Dutch R&D facility simultaneously with its European headquarter and
a production facility. The laboratory is therefore considered to be a greenfield investment. The Dutch R&D activities
of General Electric Plastics are important for the European market. Dow Benelux (US) co-located a new R&D facility
close to existing production units. This R&D laboratory now hosts Dow's European R&D centre.
Still, the R&D activities of both Dow and General Electric Plastics in the Netherlands fall far short to the size of
production and distribution. This suggest that the two companies chose the Netherlands because of the physical
infrastructure and its geographical position within the European market rather than because of excellent R&D
location factors.
Source: Table 2.9 
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Examples of R&D-related foreign direct investments after 1980: mergers and acquisitions
Solvay Pharmaceuticals: physical proximity
Solvay Pharmaceuticals (Belgium) acquired Duphar from Philips. The former Duphar R&D lab is now one of
Solvay's main R&D locations. The Duphar lab was located close to Solvay’s Belgian R&D centre. This might have
been one of Solvay’s arguments to acquire Duphar. Distance is not ‘dead’ because of the ICT as often suggested.
Personal contacts are still of importance (for more on ‘distance’, see the next sections).
Yamanouchi: by coincidence, but extending the acquired Dutch knowledge
Yamanouchi (Japan) acquired Gist's pharmaceutical businesses because it was looking for an access to the
European market. Gist was for sale, its R&D operations included. It has been said that Yamanouchi would have
chosen for the UK if the R&D investment was of the greenfield type. Since the acquisition of Gist, Yamanouchi
extended its R&D operations in Leiderdorp, and, moreover, executes several cooperative research projects with
Dutch universities. Appearingly, the Japanese did not want to loose the existing knowledge embodied in the
subsidiary’s employees.
Corus: strengthening market position and complementarity of knowledge
Corus is the product of a merger between Hoogovens and British Steel in 1999. Both companies conducted about
the same amounts of R&D, hence the share of Hoogovens' R&D in Corus' total R&D is high. The main reason for
the merger was the need to establish a leading company with a broad portfolio of three metals (plain steel, stainless
steel, aluminium) to serve increasingly demanding customers. The technological know-how of Hoogovens on the
combination of plain steel and aluminium was an asset fancied by British Steel, which had complementary
knowledge on stainless steel.
Medtronic, Thales, Paccar and ICI: acquisition of Dutch know-how
For several acquisitions of formerly Dutch-owned firms, we conjecture that innovative capabilities were the main
(although not the only) motivation. Examples include Medtronic, Thales, Paccar and ICI, which have acquired
Vitatron, Signaal, DAF Trucks and Quest, respectively. The Dutch subsidiaries of these foreign firms all play a central
role in the R&D programme of the company:
• Vitatron develops pacemaker technology. Medtronic acquired Vitatron in 1986. The technology of Vitatron
complemented Medtronic’s knowledge on cardiovascular products very well. In the same year, Medtronic
extended its Dutch R&D through the establishment of Bakken Research in Maastricht. This is near the Academic
Hospital of Maastricht, considered as a world-top location for cardiovascular research.
• The former Philips subsidiary Signaal is one of Thales’ most important acquisitions around 1990. Recently, it
acquired some more divisions of Philips.
• Paccar acquired DAF Trucks in 1996 in order to have access to DAF's knowledge stock on the development and
production of medium-heavy to heavy trucks. DAF is now one of the four top brands of Paccar. 
• Quest International, headquartered in Naarden, has been acquired by ICI from Unilever in 1997. It is now one
of the four core businesses of ICI. Quest has two main divisions, Flagrances and Food. Naarden is the main
R&D centre for Food; R&D for Flagrances is located in the UK.
Source: Table 2.9 
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Is Dutch affiliate R&D important for foreign companies?
The share of Dutch affiliate R&D in the world-wide R&D efforts of a company is an indicator of
the importance Dutch R&D plays in the company’s innovation process. Table 2.7 provides the
(admittedly partial) data. We make three observations.
• Low shares of Dutch R&D in foreign company’s R&D
First, the share of Dutch R&D in the foreign companies' world-wide R&D is in general lower
than the share of Dutch R&D in Dutch-owned companies’ world-wide R&D. Economies of scale
and scope in R&D call for a concentration of R&D activities. Multinational firms typically choose
to concentrate R&D in the home country (Fors, 1998). Table 2.5 support this claim also for
Dutch-owned multinationals. Hence, the share of Dutch R&D in a foreign company’s total R&D
effort is small in general.
• Very large multinationals have the lowest shares
Second, the relative importance of Dutch R&D differs considerably between the foreign
companies. We find that companies with a share below 5% are generally very large
multinationals, active in many countries, such as Ericsson, Dow, GE, J&J and Glaxo Wellcome.
If companies choose to spread R&D over all these countries, the small share of Dutch R&D is
evident. However, a small size does not imply per se that the Dutch R&D is just ‘adaptation' or
Table 2.7 Foreign-owned companies: share of Dutch R&D in the company’s total R&D, 1983-2000
1983 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000
Lucent 3.5 (‘94) 2.5 2.5 (‘01)
Ericsson 2.7 1.5 3.2 (‘98) 2.2
Corus 36.0
Solvay 25.4 23.8 26.1 24 13.7 14.0
Medtronic 14.2 11.5 (‘94) 10.0
ICI 13.1
Dow 2.2 2.6 4.4 4.7 4.1 3.4
Paccar 29.0
Thales 1.0
Yamanouchi 2.4 (‘91) 1.8 3.3 4.1
GE Plastics 1.1 0.9
PetroFina (TFE) 24.7 24.6 (‘94) 18.2 (‘99/’97)
J&J 0.8 (‘92) 1.2 0.8 (‘97)
Wartsila 17.1 (‘92) 30.3 16.6 (‘97)
Sandoz (Novartis) 1.4 (‘93)
SKF 6.9 (‘90/’92) 17.3
Glaxo Wellcome 0.7 0.5 (‘98)
Hercules 5.9 (‘92) 16.6 8.5 9.0
Main sources: CPB company database and company websites, November 2001 
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‘development' for the Dutch market, as the 2 boxes in this section illustrate. Most of the other
foreign companies in Table 2.7 with a Dutch share of more than 5 per cent are more oriented to
Europe.
• Changes in shares of Dutch R&D in total R&D?
Third, we find that for some companies the share of Dutch R&D changes substantially over the
years. Examples include Solvay (decreasing), PetroFina (decreasing), Wartsila (fluctuating), SKF
(increasing), and Hercules (fluctuating). However, for other companies, the share of Dutch R&D
did not seem to change substantially. They neither tend to move away from the Netherlands at
favor of foreign-located R&D, nor do they increase Dutch R&D activity relative to foreign R&D.
However, the quality of the data does not permit strong conclusions here.
Total real expenditures by foreign-owned companies increase
Does the size of Dutch R&D by the foreign companies change over time? Table 2.8 shows real
expenditures on R&D in the Netherlands by the foreign companies in the 1980s and 1990s. The
table sketches a diverse picture. Some foreign companies have increased the size of their Dutch
R&D activities, but others have decreased activities. For some companies the rise or fall is
Table 2.8 Foreign-owned companies: R&D expenditure in the Netherlands, 1983-2000 (in mln 1999 Dfl)
1983 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000 Trend
a
Lucent 186 153 (‘94) 212 233 (‘01) 
Ericsson 75 68 203 (‘98) 214 
Hoogovens (Corus) 71 83 106 90 127 (‘98) 117 
Solvay 122 135 226 124 104 108 
Bakken/Vitatron
(Medtronic) 24 42 (‘94) 90 +
Quest (ICI) 74
Dow Benelux 32 47 75 65 72 70 
DAF (Paccar) 112 132 68 
Thales Nederland 68
Yamanouchi Europe 10 (‘91) 12 32 49 +
GE Plastics 37 35 43 
Sigma (PetroFina)  43 44 32 21 
Cordis (J&J) 19 (‘92) 34 33 (‘97) 20 
Stork Wartsila
(NSD) 16 (‘92) 28 32 (‘97) +
Sandoz (Novartis) 35 (‘93)
SKF 12 31 +
GSK Nederland 22 18 (‘98) 
Hercules 8 (‘92) 14 17 +
Main sources: CPB company database and company websites, November 2001. Amounts in prices of 1999.
a Trend: + positive;  negative;  fluctuating. 
12  They used data on US patents by large Dutch multinationals in the period 1969-1995, and divided the patents
into those generated from R&D at non-Dutch locations and those generated from R&D in the Netherlands.
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substantial and in a short time. Ericsson, Medtronic, Yamanouchi, Wartsila and SKF multiplied
their R&D efforts in the Netherlands during the 1990s. In contrast, Paccar and Solvay halved
their Dutch R&D activities in this period. Over-all, the increases outweigh the reductions, and
sharp increases outnumber sharp declines. This is consistent with Table 2.3, which showed that
aggregate foreign-owned company R&D in the Netherlands is doubled in the period 1993-1999.
Changes at foreign affiliate R&D locations in the Netherlands
Foreign firms generally do not close down Dutch-based R&D laboratories. The exception proves
the rule. For example, Genencor (US) decreased the R&D of the acquired industrial enzyme
division of Gist Brocades. Hoechst closed down nearly all its businesses in the Netherlands,
including its Dutch R&D laboratory. Yamanouchi moved its R&D activities from Delft to Leiden.
Foreign R&D is here to stay
In sum, at the aggregate level we find that the overall size of Dutch R&D activity by foreign
companies has increased over the years. At the firm level, we find substantial heterogeneity with
respect to the rise and decline of R&D activities, but we still observe that R&D sites are not
relocated because of changes in the nationality of the owner.
Other empirical studies confirm this impression. For instance, Cantwell and Janne (1999) argue
that the Netherlands became increasingly attractive during the period 1969-1995, in particular
in R&D in the branches of ‘other organical chemicals', electrical systems and
telecommunication technologies.
12 These fields are the specific strengths of the large Dutch
multinationals, which extended and strengthened these technological competences at foreign
R&D locations, by taking ‘advantage of local sources of expertise and innovation’. Cantwell and
Janne also note that the above mentioned fields of expertise remain the knowledge basis of the
Netherlands, and no drastic changes over time have been observed. Dutch R&D remains strong
where it was traditionally strong.
Conclusions
Analysis of R&D spending by foreign affiliates in the Netherlands reveals that:
• Before 1980, new R&D was often co-located close to existing Dutch business activities of the
foreign company. After 1980, most foreign companies started R&D through acquisitions of
Dutch-owned R&D intensive firms.
• For several foreign multinationals, the Netherlands is not an important location for R&D
(measured by the share of Dutch R&D in concern R&D), because they are active around the 
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world, or because they concentrate R&D in the home country. For other foreign firms, the
Dutch affiliate R&D has strategic importance.
• Once established, foreign affiliate R&D in the Netherlands generally continued. At the aggregate
level, foreign R&D in the Netherlands has grown.
In sum, foreign R&D investments in the Netherlands are typically of the non-greenfield type.
Once established, they are generally here to stay. The size of foreign affiliate R&D efforts in the
Netherlands has grown over the years.
2.5 Conclusions
We summarize the trends in Dutch-owned and foreign-owned R&D in the Netherlands:
• The structure of Dutch aggregate company R&D is relatively stable. 
• Dutch-owned companies typically do not move R&D abroad. New foreign R&D is generally
additional to the company’s R&D effort.
• Usually, foreign companies start R&D activities in the Netherlands by means of non-greenfield
investments. In general, they do not tend to move R&D away once located here. On average,
foreign companies increased their R&D efforts in the Netherlands.
• The location of R&D in the Netherlands is relatively constant over time. That is, Dutch R&D
laboratories are immobile. But ownership, including nationality of ownership, may change. 
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Table 2.9 Foreign-owned companies’ R&D: greenfield, co-location, acquisition or merger?
First year in 
Netherlands
Company History of business and R&D activities in Netherlands R&D in Netherlands
started through:
Before the Second World War
1914 SKF (Swe) 1914: Forms sales subsidiary in Netherlands
Today: Concentration Company R&D in Netherlands in
Engineering & Research Center (ERC) at Nieuwegein
Co-location
1920 Ericsson (Swe) 1893: First activities in Netherlands
1920: Establishment of Ericsson Telefoon Maatschappij in
Netherlands (first subsidiary for parent outside Sweden)
Today: Dutch divisions' R&D activities within ‘Eurolab
Netherlands' important for Company R&D (telecom R&D,




1934: Opens sales office in Amsterdam, supporting sales in
Europe
1963: Building of Combustion Controls Center factory in
Emmen with R&D (after discovery gas in Slochteren)
1974: European Distribution Center near Schiphol
1985: Combustion Controls Center becomes ‘Center of
Excellence' within Honeywell










1957: Opens sales office in Rotterdam
1960s: Factories in Terneuzen, location becomes Dow
Benelux's headquarter (biggest production site outside
USA). Values infrastructure highly.
1976: R&D center opens in Terneuzen, now Europe's largest




1960s: PetroFina (B) establishes Sigma, and a subsidiary in
Netherlands. 
1972: Extends Dutch subsidiary's activities into Europe in
context of diversification
1999: merger PetroFina, Total Oil and Elf into Total Fina Elf
Today: Sigma is part of SigmaKalon Group with headquarter
and central R&D in Amsterdam





1967: Establishes a distribution center near Schiphol.
1968: Establishes production unit in Kerkrade
1986: Acquires Vitatron because of its pacemaker
technology, and establishes Bakken Research Institute near




Table 2.9 (cont. I)
First year in
Netherlands




1968: CAP Europe establishes CAP Nederland in Amsterdam
(Moret started activities in Netherlands in 1883)
1992: Cap Gemini Group acquires Volmac BV 
Today: Increasing role Netherlands in mobile internet R&D.
Recently, opening European lab in Utrecht.
2000: Merger Cap Gemini, Gemini Consulting, and Ernst &
Young Consulting into CGEY.
Probably through co-location
within CAP Nederland and




1968: Cordis Europa (Roden) is incorporated into Cordis Int. 
Expands gradually R&D and other activities.
1995: J&J acquire Cordis
1999: J&J acquire Centocor (subsidiary in Leiden since 1985)




1971: Opens European headquarter and R&D department in
Bergen op Zoom





1960s: Philips Duphar employees import and distribute
drugs of Glaxo
1973: Glaxo opens own sales office in Hoofddorp. 
1970s: Starts an own R&D programme (applied clinical
research for registration)
1995: Glaxo acquires Wellcome
Today: Relatively much of Glaxo Wellcome's registration
research takes place in Netherlands
2000: Announcement merger of Glaxo Wellcome and Smith




1978: Alliance DE and Sara Lee (USA) 
1988: DE is integrated into Sara Lee Corp.
Today: DE carries a number of top brands of Sara Lee;





1980: Acquires Duphar from Philips
Today: Netherlands one of main research centers for Solvay 
Acquisition
1980 Eli Lilly (USA) 1980: Subsidiary in Netherlands for sales; but own clinical
research increases utilizing scientific climate in Netherlands
Today: Clinical research in Netherlands is held in high regard




Table 2.9 (cont. II)
First year in
Netherlands




Early 1980s: Acquires diesel motor division from Stork
Today: Zwolle is one of the main engine production
locations for Wartsila; increased R&D investments in
mid-1990s
2001: announces closure of factory in Zwolle, including the
Dutch R&D department, because of overcapacity problems,
but is eager to take over Lips (Drunen), which has R&D.
Acquisition
1989 Lucent (USA) 1989: AT&T (with division Lucent) acquires Philips telecom
division
1996: Lucent independent from AT&T
Today: Has Bell Labs in Netherlands; R&D mainly in
communication and internet, recent building of R&D in
Enschede
Acquisition
1989 Thales (Fra) 1989: Acquires Signaal from Philips in context of European
expansion. Marked an important breakpoint in 's history.
1990s: Signaal broadens range of customers; new systems
designed.




1991: Acquires pharmaceutical divisions from Gist Brocades
to get access to European market
Today: Parent company values current high-quality R&D
employment in Leiden, builds further on this force and
increases R&D
Acquisition
<1992 Hercules 1992: Centralizes R&D in UK and Netherlands into one new
European R&D center in Barneveld (Gld)
Tastemaker is a joint venture with Fries&Fries (USA).
1998: Barneveld officially one of the 2 Hercules world-wide
research centers





1994: Nalco (USA) establishes European headquarters and
R&D laboratorium in Oegstgeest (ZH)
1999: Suez Lyonnaise (Fra) acquires Nalco, which is
integrated with Calgon and Aquazur
2001: Nalco merges with Ondeo, and changes name.
Probably greenfield
1993 Novartis (Swi) 1993: Sandoz AG acquires Zaadunie (later S&G Seeds)
1996: Merger Ciba Geighy and Sandoz AG into Novartis
2000: Merger Novartis Agribusiness with Zeneca
Agrochemicals into Syngenta
Acquisition for former
Sandoz; merger for Novartis
and Syngenta 
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Table 2.9 (cont. III)
First year in
Netherlands
Company History of business and R&D activities in Netherlands R&D in Netherlands
started through:
<1995 Bosch (Ger) Before 1995: Dutch activities of Bosch (packaging machines,
Blaupunkt, and Telenorma) do not amount to anything much
to the Bosch Group. Supposedly no Dutch R&D.
1995: Acquires Van Doorne’s Transmissie (VDT), which in
turn is a result of development activities of DAF. Probably the
knowledge of VDT has been interesting to Bosch.
Acquisition
1996 Paccar (USA) 1996: Acquires DAF, being one of the most significant
acquisitions in Paccar's history
Today: DAF is one of main operations of Paccar. DAF's R&D
important to Paccar.
Acquisition
1997 ICI (UK) 1997: Acquires Quest (and some other chemical divisions)
from Unilever
Today: Quest is one of the four core activities of ICI (which





1999: Merger with Van Leer into HVL Merger
1999 Corus (UK) 1999: Merger Hoogovens and British Steel Merger
2000 Invensys (UK) 2000: Acquired Baan Company to establish its own position
as leading software developer. Baan’s R&D proved to be
complementary, as well as its sales position and talent pool.
Acquisition
2001 Benteler (GER) 2001: Acquires PD&E from Nedcar (which wanted to dispose
PD&E, and continue just production in the Netherlands). To
Benteler, PD&E will help to strengthen Benteler’s world-wide
position as technology-driven developer of automotive




Today: all corporate R&D of Q8 is located in Europoort
(Kuwait Petroleum Research & Technology)
Unknown
Sources: CPB company database, newspapers, and company websites, November 2001 
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3 Location factors for R&D
3.1 Introduction
What determines the trends in the location of R&D? What are the decisive location factors for
R&D? And what is the quality of these factors in the Netherlands compared to other countries?
This section examines these questions. Section 3.2 surveys the factors that have been identified
as decisive for the location of R&D in the literature respectively by our interviewees. Section 3.3
offers a benchmark of these location factors in the Netherlands and various other countries
competing for the location of R&D. Section 3.4 confronts the benchmark results with the actual
R&D location choices of firms. Section 3.5 discusses trends that could change the quality and
relevance of R&D location factors. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Decisive location factors for R&D
Greenfield R&D investment
What determines a firm's choice where to locate its R&D activities? Table 3.1 presents the
ranking of location factors for greenfield R&D according to Buck Consultants International, a
location consultancy firm. Firms choose for locations where highly qualified labour is available
at reasonable costs, where universities and technological institutes conduct state-of-the-art
research, and where travel to foreign destinations is easy.
Table 3.1 Location factors for greenfield R&D
crucial very important important less important




quality of local suppliers,
customers and competitors
quality and costs of
telecommunication and
energy









proximity and quality of
international airport
quality of life, costs of living,
and international schools
regulatory framework
Source: Buck Consultants International (1999b) 
13 See section 2.4 and also Buck Consultants International (1999b), Gassman and Von Zedtwitz (1999), OECD
(1999), Niosi and Godin (1999), Ernst & Young (2000), and Wintjes (2001).
14 For example, PamGene, a bio-tech firm located in ‘s Hertogenbosch, The Netherlands, decided not to relocate to
San Francisco because moving its entire team of researchers turned out to be impossible (Het Financieele
Dagblad, March 28, 2001).
15 Philips' NatLab, for example, is located in Eindhoven rather than Breda because in the 1890s the Philips family
had tobacco-related business contacts in the Eindhoven area and because the family won the auction of an
abandoned Eindhoven buckskin factory (Minne, 1997). DSM Research is located in the Dutch province of Limburg
because of the Dutch government's decision to fight unemployment of coal miners in the 1960s and 1970s.
Intervet, the animal health subsidiary of Akzo Nobel, is located in Boxmeer because a long time ago a veterinarian
of a local cattle feed producer had specialized in chicken health (NRC Handelsblad, April 14, 2001).
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For firms employing specific technologies, however, the picture may look different, and other
location factors may turn out to be decisive (Meyer-Krahmer and Reger, 1999). For example, for
R&D on the edge of biotechnology and pharmacy the quality of the local science system is vital,
and consequently the UK is one of the thriving places to locate this type of R&D. Clinical
pharmaceutical R&D, on the other hand, tends to locate in large markets with high standards of
drug approval (e.g., the US and Japan). Shaving customs vary with culture, hence Asian markets
for electric shaving have to be created through local R&D. The most impressive web sites are
said to be build in Amsterdam because of an abundance of artistic but computer-minded people
at a major hub in international internet traffic.
Non-greenfield R&D investment
However, most R&D investment decisions do not concern greenfield R&D. Since the 1950s
firms typically start new R&D activities through co-location, mergers and acquisitions, or
expansions of existing R&D operations.
13 Economies of scale and scope in (R&D-)operations and
high costs of moving R&D assets may induce firms to adhere to existing locations rather than to
move to those places that are most attractive to greenfield R&D (Howells, 1990; Albert, 1999).
14
Consequently, in many cases the location of new R&D is also dependent on previous location
decisions, of R&D and non-R&D operations alike, determined by location factors relevant at that
time for the type of investment of those days (Gassman and Von Zedtwitz, 1999; Zander, 1999).
In other words, R&D location decisions are path-dependent. Ultimately, location decisions may
even be determined by chance.
15
Still, truly multinational firms might decide upon R&D locations as if the project has a
greenfield character. These firms can benefit from economies of scale and scope at many
locations, since they tend to operate multiple ‘centres of excellence' and many more
development centres (Pearce, 1999). Examples important for the Netherlands include Ericsson,
IBM, Shell, and Unilever. Although history is a major determinant of the location decision for
an incremental R&D project, it need not be important for the decision which one to single out. 
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Indeed, interviewees from several foreign R&D firms in the Netherlands confirmed that they
compete for company-wide R&D projects and company-wide R&D budgets with the firm's
establishments in other countries. Locations that do not offer the best facilities for R&D will not
be the prime choice of company management. Interviewees from Dutch multinationals asserted
that there is some competition with foreign establishments over new R&D projects, but that
those overseas facilities generally lack the advantages of scale delivered by the large Dutch R&D
lab (see also section 2.3).
Also, one may argue that history does not influence R&D location decisions in brand new fields
of technology (e.g., ICT, genomics), since firms simply do not have established R&D labs in
these disciplines yet. This argument is not always convincing, however. First, firms have to learn
about the new discipline in order to assess its potential before investing in a new R&D site. The
firm's establishment that acquires the necessary absorptive capacity for this appraisal will have
some advantage over other sites. Second, the firm will focus its R&D in the new discipline on
innovations that are adjacent to its current product portfolio and knowledge base in order to
benefit from economies of scope.
Apart from reasons of path-dependency, do location factors for non-greenfield R&D differ from
those of greenfield R&D? Basically, no. Our interviewees broadly acknowledged the location
factors and their classification according to importance as reported in table 3.1. Generally
speaking, however, they put relatively more weight on the quality of regional suppliers and
customers, including start-ups and spin-offs from universities, and less weight on the size and
scope of government incentives. Interestingly, our interviewees often phrased some of the
location factors differently and more clearly. Table 3.2 offers a non-ranked overview of the
location factors as they put them forward. 
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The OECD agrees with these selections of R&D location factors, see table 3.3. The Organisation
does not rank the factors according to importance.
Table 3.2 Location factors for R&D according to our interviewees
a
Class of R&D location factors R&D location factors
Researchers • number of graduates and PhDs in S&T, in current time but
also in the upcoming decade
• quality of PhD candidates in S&T
Knowledge infrastructure • high-quality public knowledge infrastructure in the appropriate
fields (spearheads) of S&T
• thriving innovative entrepreneurship, innovative SMEs to
supply to and be acquired by MNEs
• university researchers have high-quality personal networks
throughout the world
• entrepreneurial culture in universities, many spin-offs from
universities
• professional research contract negotiators at universities
Government • government policy to ensure availability of qualified labour in
the future
• presence of an important patent office or market approval
agency
• easily available working permits, in particular for researchers
from developing countries
• subsidies for joint research of private and public entities
• the government is a demanding launching customer
• the government establishes an image of dedication towards
R&D
Other • leading demand: customers (final and intermediate) with a
love for innovative products and services
• children and adults alike consider S&T fun rather than
frightening
• headquarters of MNEs deciding on procurement of complex,
innovative products and systems
• no stigma for entrepreneur if start-up ends in failure
a Factors are ranked according to subject, not to importance 
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Note that firms take the quality of some location factors for granted if provided adequately by
any country considered to be an eligible location candidate. Examples of such factors include
political stability, legal security, and an adequate telecommunication infrastructure. For this
reason, this sort of location factors does not show up in the listings.
Conclusion
History is an important determinant of the location of R&D, embedded in the economy. Firms
often choose to start new R&D operations through co-location, mergers and acquisitions of
existing firms, or expansions of existing R&D operations. For many companies, the advantages
of scale and scope offered by the home-based R&D lab is the decisive factor determining the
location of a new R&D project. Still, many multinational firms operate multiple R&D sites in
multiple countries and they make these sites compete for new, incremental R&D projects. Apart
from the strong influence of history on the location of R&D, the decisive location factors for
R&D are:
• the supply of qualified researchers in science and technology
• the quality of universities and technological institutes in appropriate fields of science and
technology, including the quality of the science-industry knowledge transfer
Table 3.3 Location factors for R&D according to the OECD
a
Class of R&D location factors R&D location factors
Skilled labour • availability of science and engineering professionals
• skilled, mobile, flexible and risk-taking workforce, capable of
continual learning and training
Public knowledge infrastructure • high quality basic and applied research
• multidisciplinary co-operation
• knowledge transfer between public and private sector
Government • fiscal measures: depreciation allowances, deductability, tax
credits
• support for venture capital
• regulatory and legal issues: intellectual property laws, red tape
of starting a business, bankruptcy laws, standard and product
safety regulations, competition law
• government procurement practices
• policy to encourage competitive co-operation
Source: OECD (1999)
a Limited to location factors directly targetable by government policy. Factors are ranked according to subject, not to importance 
16 See also Meyer-Krahmer and Reger (1999), OECD (1999), Pearce (1999), Midelfart-Knarvik et al (2000), and
Ernst & Young (2001) for evidence. For anecdotical evidence, consider the statement by Biogen, the second largest
US biotech firm, that subsidies do not influence the location decision for the firm’s new European production and
R&D site (M. Abrahamse, ‘Nederland te inflexibel voor Biogen’, Het Financieele Dagblad, September 7, 2001).
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Costs of use of location factors, for example wages of highly educated researchers, seem to be a
less important location factor (although wages may mirror the supply of researchers to some
extent).
16
3.3 Benchmarking the Netherlands as a location for R&D
We compare the Netherlands to competing locations for R&D. We first present an assessment of
the R&D labour force and the public knowledge infrastructure, respectively, and then continue
with a benchmark of other R&D location factors.
The reader should keep in mind that the indicators used in this benchmark are often imperfect,
prone to measurement problems and misinterpretation, and imperfectly comparable among
countries. In particular, a highly efficient R&D process could off-set a bad ranking on an input
indicator, and the exploitation of comparative advantages could imply that some countries rank
high on one indicator while others perform well according to another one. Hence, the
conclusions should be handled with care.
3.3.1 Benchmarking the R&D labour force
Education
Test scores on mathematics and science literacy achievement of students in their final year of
secondary school reveal that the Netherlands is one of the leading countries with respect to the
quality of education of science and technology. This holds both for the average student and for
the group of best students (Mullis et al, 1998, tables 1.1 and 1.2). Business executives are less
content about the quality of science teaching in Dutch compulsory schools, and they put forward
that the Dutch youth has a lack of interest in science and technology (GCR, 2000, table 7.02,
and WCY, 2001, tables 4.3.15 and 4.3.16). Our interviewees, however, typically argued that the
number of secondary school students taking courses in mathematics and science is satisfying, as
is the quality of teaching in these fields.
Graduation
At the graduate level, the share of Dutch students having obtained a degree in science and
engineering is relatively low, see figure 3.1. A third of Dutch students in higher education choose
to graduate in science and engineering, compared to half of the students in countries like 
17 Peculiarities in the classification of curricula explain part of the difference (AWT, 1999).
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Germany, Sweden, and in particular Finland.
17 Since a relatively large share of the Dutch youth
does complete higher education, the share of the Dutch young population with a science and
engineering degree is at the average of the subset of EU member countries (figure 3.2). Our
interviewees confirmed the relative lack of interest in studying science and technology at the
university level. They typically argued that undergraduates are badly informed about the
long-term career opportunities in science and technology, that university curricula are not
appealing enough, and that wages for PhD students (a natural next step) are low compared to
starting salaries of competing jobs.
Private initiatives to foster the supply of researchers in chemistry
The Dutch chemical industry employs many strategies to invite children and student into a science & technology
career. Pandemonia Science Theatre visit primary and secondary schools to perform a science show. Employees
of chemical firms lecture at school and universities. Firms welcome visits, donate second-hand equipment, offer
scholarships, and sponsor student associations.
Recently, the industry proposed to hire PhD students themselves rather than hiring them once the doctor’s degree
has been obtained. The industry said to be prepared not to discount PhD student’s wage for receiving education.
Universities do discount wages by about 25% in the first year of the PhD program, and by 15% in the third year.
Source: Y. Doorduyn, Dansende rozijnen, NRC Handelsblad, July 18, 2001, and O. Porcu, ‘Dubbel salaris lost chemieprobleem op’, Het Financieele










































Figure 3.1   Percentages of graduates taking a Science and Engineering degree, 1996 
Source: Eurostat, Human Resources in Science and Technology.
Notes: Year of observation is 1994 for Belgium and Greece. No observation available for France and for non-European countries.
Figure 3.2   Percentage of young population (25-29 years) holding a Science and Engineering degree, 1996 
Source: Eurostat, Human Resources in Science and Technology.





















































Figures 3.3 and 3.4 reveal that the relative size of the Dutch R&D labour force lags behind a
group of leading countries (Scandinavia, Germany, France, US). The trend is upwards in most
countries, and strongly upwards in the Scandinavian countries. These observations also hold
true if restricted to the labour force of the private sector.
Figure 3.3 displays the share of the labour force employed as researchers, i.e. as
‘professionals engaged in the conception or creation of new knowledge, products, processes,
methods, and systems, and in the management of the projects concerned’ (OECD, 1994, p.86),
or university graduate. Note that this definition includes professionals in e.g. the social sciences
(OECD, 1994, p.162). Figure 3.4 reports on a broader definition of R&D personnel, including
technicians and equivalent R&D staff and other R&D supporting personnel.
Figure 3.3   Researchers (or university graduates) per thousand labour force
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators, table 12.
Notes: Year of observation as indicated, or closest year available. No observation available for Hungary (1980) and the US (1998). 


















































Figure 3.4  R&D personnel per thousand labour force
Source: OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators, table 9.
Notes: Year of observation as indicated, or closest year available. No observation available for Hungary (1980), the UK (1998) and
the US (all years).
Our interviewees put forward that their firms themselves do not face difficulties in hiring
suitably qualified researchers. They typically argued that graduates still queue up because of the
extraordinary research facilities and interesting research projects their firms offer. The labour
shortages are felt by other (i.e., smaller) firms, and, moreover, these shortages are the same in
competing R&D locations in the developed world. Nevertheless, they are afraid that inadequate
labour supply will also threaten the R&D activities of their firms in the near future.
18
3.3.2 Benchmarking the public knowledge infrastructure
The performance of the public knowledge infrastructure of the Netherlands stands a
comparison with competing locations for private R&D. Researchers at Dutch universities and
technological institutes publish 2,3% of the world production of scientific papers at the cost of
2,2% of the OECD expenditures on public R&D (Tijssen et al, 2001, table 3.2, and OECD, Main
Science and Technology Indicators). The quality and scientific impact of this research output is
relatively high, since scientific publications (co-)authored by Dutch researchers are cited 
19 It should be noted that indicators of scientific publications measure the production of the system a few years
ago rather than current or expected performance. Indeed, in several scientific disciplines, there is an important
delay in publication. Moreover, some time tends to pass by before the value of a scientific papers is recognized
through citations in other papers.
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relatively often (Tijssen et al, 2001, table 3.2). The share of Dutch publications co-authored by a
foreign-based researcher is comparable to other medium-sized European countries, suggesting
that Dutch researchers neither take more care nor neglect their international personal networks
relative to researchers based in competing locations for R&D (Tijssen et al, 2001, chapter 4).
19
However, it has been argued that the Dutch universities may face difficulties in keeping up with
large US, UK, Swiss and Scandinavian institutes, because in some disciplines research is
scattered across many universities and critical mass for risky or multi-disciplinary research is
lacking (AWT, 1999).
Some indicators suggest that Dutch public research is relatively helpful for private firms.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show that the share of public R&D financed by private firms and the share of
firms' R&D performed by the public knowledge infrastructure is relatively large in the
Netherlands. The first indicator is particularly interesting, since it reflects the decision of firms
to contract out R&D activities to the public knowledge infrastructure. Business executives also
observe that companies in the Netherlands collaborate relatively closely with local universities in
their R&D activities (GCR, 2000, table 7.06). This positive picture may be flawed, however, by
the special position of TNO in the public knowledge infrastructure of the Netherlands. Since
TNO is relatively large compared to similar (semi)public knowledge institutes in other countries,
TNO might perform R&D-projects by order of private firms that are commissioned to private







































































































Figure 3.5   Percentage of R&D financed by firms that is performed by (semi)public organisations
Source: own calculation using OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators, tables 2, 13, 17, 22 and 32. Year of observation as
indicated, or closest year available. No observation available for AUT (1998), BEL (1981), and SWI (1998).
Figure 3.6  Percentage of R&D performed by (semi)public organisations that is financed by firms
Source: own calculation using OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators, tables 2, 13, 17, 22 and 32. Year of observation as
indicated, or closest year available. No observation available for AUT (1998), BEL (1981), and SWI (1998). 
20 Tijssen (2000) interviewed Dutch inventors. He found similar evidence.
21 These arguments hold for many countries. Schmoch et al (2000), for example, extensively discuss the German
case.
22 Not only the number of entrepreneurial university researchers, but also the number of innovative entrepreneurs
in general is said to be relatively low in the Netherlands. For example, the rate of entry of new firms in fast-growing
industries is low in the Netherlands compared to the UK and the US (EIM, 1999).
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Other indicators contradict such a positive claim about the quality of science-industry knowledge
transfer in the Netherlands. The number of Dutch firms cooperating with a public knowledge
institute is comparable to the EU-average (Eurostat, Community Innovation Survey, tables c2
and c8), while the Scandinavian countries are leading. In conjunction with the indicator
presented in figure 3.5, this might suggest that large R&D intensive corporations have relatively
easy access to the public knowledge infrastructure in the Netherlands, while medium and small
businesses have not. Moreover, science-industry knowledge transfers are said to be hampered by
an inadequate entrepreneurial culture in European universities, including those in the
Netherlands, in absolute terms and relative to US universities (AWT, 2001a and 2001b). We
were unable to find evidence on the quality of the entrepreneurial culture at Dutch universities
relative to other European countries.
Our interviewees acknowledged the high quality of research performed by the Dutch public
knowledge infrastructure.
20 But they argued that a large potential for knowledge transfers is still
untapped:
21
• Dutch universities and technological institutes serve established large R&D firms well, but do
not optimally cater to the needs of smaller firms and of firms operating in new fields of
technology.
• Dutch researchers hesitate to spin-out of the university system, to found a business, and to
cooperate with established firms on a commercial base.
22 Dutch universities and technological
institutes do not foster their start-ups and lack a intra-mural entrepreneurial culture. Science
parks do not offer much value-added compared to standard business parks.
• Dutch universities generally lack the skills and knowledge needed to conclude and manage
research contracts with private businesses. In particular, they lack the skills necessary to file and
exploit a patent successfully.
Interviewees applauded the recent establishment of four Technological Top Institutes (TTIs) to
pursue a scientifically sound research agenda that is tailored towards some of Dutch industry's
needs. They argued that the world technology frontier is far too stretched to be completely
covered by the public knowledge infrastructure of a small country. Industry fishes the global sea
of ideas mainly by itself, with the guiding assistance of researchers at local universities and
technological institutes, and their world-wide personal networks in particular. 
23 This claim is based on computations using figure 1 and table 15 from EIM (1999) and tabel A1.1 from OECD
(1998a). See however Cornet (2000) for a discussion of the quality and comparability of international data on the
level of educational attainment.
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3.3.3 Benchmarking other R&D location factors
This section benchmarks the Netherlands on a set of other, less important location factors for
R&D.
Entrepreneurship and innovation in SMEs
Dutch SMEs do not lead the rankings of innovators in Europe. The share of Dutch firms that
market innovative products and services is above EU-average, in particular in manufacturing,
but the Netherlands does not lead (CBS, 1999, table 6.2.1). The share in turnover of new or
significantly improved manufacturing products in total turnover of SMEs is close to EU-average
(CBS, 1999, table 6.2.2). The share of entrepreneurs in the highly skilled labour force is in the
Netherlands comparable to the UK, larger than in Denmark, but lower than in Belgium and
Germany.
23
However, demand for capital by firms at early or expansion stage as a percentage of GDP is
large in the Netherlands, comparable to leading countries as Canada and the US, and ahead of
the UK, Scandinavia, Germany and France (OECD, 2000a, figure 23). Furthermore, business
executives are relatively impressed by the innovative competence of buyers and in particular
suppliers in the Netherlands (GCR, 2000, tables 10.09 and 10.11). These latter indicators sketch
a more positive picture of entrepreneurship in the Netherlands.
According to our interviewees, the Dutch public knowledge sector lacks an entrepreneurial
culture contrary to e.g. Denmark and the UK. Number and quality of spin-offs from universities
is relatively low. A big hurdle is the high social price that Dutch entrepreneurs still have to pay
in case of failure: a stigma for life. Arthur Andersen and GrowthPlus (2000), however, finds
contradictory evidence on this latter issue: the social and legal consequences of bankruptcy are
less severe in the US and the Netherlands than in countries such as Belgium, Germany, France,
Sweden and the UK.
Demanding consumers
Dutch consumers have a relatively strong predisposition to buy new and different products and
brands rather than remain with previous choices and consumption patterns. Table 3.4 ranks
consumer innovativeness in the Netherlands third in a set of eleven EU countries. Business
executives confirm the relative strong demand of Dutch consumers for the latest products and
technologies (GCR, 2000, table 10.13). 
24 See "Holland's advance tax rulings are under fire from all sides", Het Financieele Dagblad, October 20, 2000,
and "Fiscus minder geneigd om investeerders tegemoet te komen", Het Financieele Dagblad, October 19, 2000.
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Proximity and quality of an international airport
Schiphol Amsterdam Airport is one of Europe's four leading airport hubs, and also one of
Europe's airports delivering most passenger satisfaction (IATA, 2000a and 2000b). For the
southern and eastern parts of the Netherlands, the international airports of Brussels and
Düsseldorf offer additional travel opportunities. Hence, international travel connections are
excellent.
Investment and technology grants
The Netherlands, France, Denmark and the US follow a leading group including Spain and
Canada in tax payers' generosity for private investments in R&D. Fiscal incentives for R&D are
smaller in competing locations such as the Nordic countries, Germany, Belgium, and the UK
(OECD, 2000a, table 6.1). Business executive consider Dutch investments incentives for FDI as
relatively generous (WCY, 2001, table 2.4.23).
Recently, the Dutch practice of advanced tax ruling for foreign firms considering a greenfield
investment in the Netherlands came under attack. This practice, which essentially involves a
statement about the definition of its tax base for the next years, has been criticised for being
unfair, although many other European countries apply or are going to apply similar
procedures.
24
Some of our interviewees added that the Dutch income tax for expatriates is relatively low. They
also brought out that international firms' perception of the Dutch fiscal climate has been
changed negatively because of the publicity mentioned above.



























Source: Steenkamp et al (1999) and information from a private conversation with Steenkamp in January 2001. 
25 Rankings that summarize a set of indicators should be handle with much care, since the relative weight given to
the indicators often lacks solid ground, and since the indicators themselves are subject to criticism.
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3.3.4 Conclusion
The indicators presented in this benchmark suggest that the Netherlands takes an average or
higher position in the overall ranking of attractiveness to business R&D. This picture is
consistent with two overall rankings of location attractiveness for R&D, featuring the
Netherlands as one of the better locations to perform R&D, see table 3.5.
25
With respect to the two decisive R&D location factors, the benchmark is not unanimously
positive for the Netherlands. First, the benchmark reveals that the relative size of the R&D
labour force lags behind a group of leading countries. Second, the benchmark is positive on the
quality of the public knowledge infrastructure, but inconclusive about the quality of the science-
industry knowledge transfer in the Netherlands. On the one hand, the share of private R&D
spending sourced out to public knowledge institutes is relatively large; on the other hand, the
number of firms cooperating with public knowledge institutes is comparable to the average
score of benchmark countries.













1 U SU SU SU S
2 Finland Finland Finland Finland
3 Switzerland Switzerland Singapore Singapore
4 Japan Germany Switzerland Luxembourg
5 Germany The Netherlands Sweden Sweden
6 The Netherlands Japan Iceland Israel
7 Singapore Sweden Canada Ireland
8 Canada Singapore Australia The Netherlands
9 Denmark Canada The Netherlands UK
10 Sweden Australia Ireland Iceland
Source: WCY (1999, 2000 and 2001) and GCR (2000). The GCR ranking is a ranking of ‘economic creativity’. 
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3.4 R&D location factors and observed R&D location choices
Do firms' R&D location choices reflect Dutch performance on R&D location factors? Are the
actual location decisions consistent with those predicted by the above benchmark? We make
four observations:
• According to data obtained from Ernst & Young, a location consultancy firm, The Netherlands
attracts its fair share of the foreign direct R&D investment projects, see table 3.6. The share of
projects established in the Netherlands is about equal to the relative size of the Dutch economy
and the relative size of R&D expenditures. Austria, Hungary, Ireland, and the UK attract
relatively many projects. Germany is a relative non-performer. A disaggregation of greenfield
and non-greenfield R&D-related FDI reveals that Austria, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, and the UK
are relatively attractive to non-greenfield R&D FDI. Denmark, Hungary, and Ireland and the UK
(again) attract a relatively large number of greenfield R&D FDI. Germany fails at both indicators.
The Netherlands gets its fair share of both greenfield and non-greenfield R&D FDI.
• Analysis by Buck Consultants International, another location consultancy firm, confirms that
the Netherlands attracts its fair share of the greenfield foreign direct R&D investment projects,
see table 3.7.
• Recent location decisions of the largest Dutch R&D spending firms in the Netherlands do not
support an unqualified statement in favour or in disfavour of the competitiveness of the
Netherlands as a location for R&D (see section 2.3). Philips, a large multinational enterprise,
employs a campus-strategy since the second half of the 1990s, concentrating R&D operations in
Eindhoven, the Netherlands. Recent foreign acquisitions however reduced the share of Philips’
R&D expenditure in the Netherlands. DSM and Océ only recently started to internationalize
their R&D activities through foreign acquisitions, most likely as a consequence of a change in
business focus. The share of R&D performed in the Netherlands by Unilever and Shell, both
truly multinational companies, fluctuates throughout the years. Apart from Shell, all these
companies increased their R&D expenditures in the Netherlands. Shell reduced its R&D
spending both in the Netherlands and in other countries.
• R&D operations of foreign firms tend to arrive in the Netherlands through co-location or
mergers and acquisitions (see table 2.8). Once established, the size of these R&D operations
tends to grow, although there are important exceptions (see table 2.7). However, the evolution of
this R&D relative to R&D activities of the firm at facilities in other countries is not clear (see
table 2.6). Therefore, this evidence does not imply a strong pro or con.
These observations should be handled with care. First, the number of R&D projects that have to
be located each year is small, hence a few projects accidentally landed in a country may have a
large impact on its relative performance. Second, there are problems with the quality of the data 
26 Measurement errors cast a cloud upon the quality of the data. First, projects may simply not be detected.
Second, a project may be wrongly classified as R&D since the larger part of the project is not R&D but, e.g.,
marketing, sales and customer support. Small errors could have a serious impact on the relative performance of a
country, since the total number of observations is small. It should be kept in mind that location consultancy firms
typically collect data for purposes different from those of this study, and that our observations of R&D efforts of
foreign firms in the Netherlands (see section 2.4) are imperfect.
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(as is usual in empirical research).
26 We cautiously conclude that there is no evidence that firms'
actual R&D location decisions clearly favour or disfavour the Netherlands relative to its main
competitors.







Share in R&D FDI
projects (%)
Share in GDP (%) Share in total R&D
expenditures (%)
Austria 2.4 6.1 4.3 2.2 2.1
Belgium 1.6 5.3 3.5 2.8 2.9
Denmark 3.1 1.5 2.3 1.5 1.7
Finland 1.6 3.1 2.3 1.3 1.9
France 8.7 18.3 13.6 14.6 18.3
Germany 10.2 7.6 8.9 21.7 28.2
Hungary 4.7 0.8 2.7 1.2 0.5
Ireland 9.4 3.1 6.2 0.9 0.7
Italy 5.5 2.3 3.9 14.3 8.1
Netherlands 5.5 4.6 5.0 4.3 5.0
Spain 7.9 8.4 8.1 7.7 3.6
Sweden 6.3 5.3 5.8 2.2 4.6
Switzerland 4.7 1.5 3.1 2.2 3.4
UK 25.2 28.2 26.7 14.7 15.3
Source R&D FDI data: Ernst & Young International Location Advisory Services. Source GDP and R&D expenditure data: OECD.
Notes: Database includes 127 greenfield and 131 non-greenfield R&D FDI projects. Software investment projects are not included. Results for the Czech Republic, Greece, Poland,
and Portugal are not reported. Year of observation for share in GDP and share in R&D expenditures is 1997. 
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These actual R&D location decisions do not perfectly match with the attractiveness of the
Netherlands as suggested by the benchmark exercise of section 3.3, in particular the overall-
rankings presented in table 3.5. One might have expected that more firms would have chosen
the Netherlands as the best location for their R&D project, or, alternatively, that the benchmark
would reveal that the Netherlands is a less-than-averagely attractive R&D location. Several
possible explanations cross the mind:
• Measurements problems blur the true R&D attractiveness and the R&D location decisions.
• Since history is also a determinant of the location of R&D, and even an important determinant,
location decisions need not to conform to the benchmark (see section 3.2).
• The benchmark may conceal that the Netherlands is a relatively unattractive location for the type
of R&D projects that are in the market today.
• What really counts is to be the best. The Netherlands may be an attractive location on average,
but for relatively few projects it may be the best location.
We do not know whether one or more of these explanations indeed clears up the imperfect
match between the actual R&D location decisions and the outcome of the R&D location
benchmark.
In sum, we conclude that it is difficult to gauge whether actual R&D location choices match
attractiveness. There is no evidence, however, that the Netherlands clearly underperforms or
outperforms in attracting R&D investments relative to its main competitors.
Table 3.7 Greenfield R&D FDI projects in the Netherlands relative to six selected European countries,
1991-1998
Number of projects in six
selected European
countries
Number of projects in the
Netherlands
Share of the Netherlands
in number of projects
1991-1992 32 3 9%
1993-1994 13 2 15%
1995-1996 20 0 0%
1997-1998 29 1 3%
1997-1998, announcements 12 4 33%
1991-1998 106 10 9%
Share of the Netherlands in GDP and in total R&D expenditures is about 7%.
Source R&D-FDI data: Buck Consultants International (1995, 1997, 1999b). Source GDP and R&D expenditure data: OECD.
Notes: Projects refer to greenfield R&D-FDI by companies from thirteen selected countries (including North-American, Asian and European
countries) into six European countries (UK, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands). Projects detected between 1991 and 1994
refer to investments from the US and Japan. Software investment project are not included. 
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3.5 Trends in R&D location attractiveness
What will become of R&D locations in the future? Previous sections sticked to the current state
of affairs. Several trends are said to affect R&D location decisions. We discuss six possible trends
put forward in the literature.
Possible trend 1: The location of R&D becomes less dependent on history
History is currently an important determinant of the location of R&D, since R&D is subject to
important economies of scale and scope, with respect to own activities and with respect to
activities of other firms and of public knowledge organisations (section 3.2). History becomes a
less important determinant if:
• new information and communication technologies reduce the need to concentrate a portfolio of
(R&D) activities geographically (Howells, 1990; Pearce, 1999). But it is unlikely that such a
reduction would be large, since many types of knowledge needed for successful R&D remain
highly tacit (Venables, 2001).
• the share of R&D performed by multinational enterprises increases and intra firm R&D re-
location is less expensive than inter firm re-location. Table 2.3 does not provide strong evidence
for the first part of this condition.
Possible trend 2: History becomes irrelevant to the location of R&D in new technologies
The arrival of new general purpose technologies such as ICT and biotechnology supports the
emergence of new R&D intensive industries. It could be argued that such new industries still
have to find a place to settle down to realise economies of scale and scope. Then, countries
should hurry and attract a substantial share of these new R&D activities under penalty of
missing this boat. However, it could also be argued that these new technologies do not arrive
like manna from heaven, but instead evolve out of existing stocks of knowledge. Then, the
localization of R&D in ‘new’ industries is as path dependent as the localization of R&D in
traditional industries.
Possible trend 3: Researchers become more mobile
The international mobility of R&D activity increases if researchers become more mobile.
Migration of highly skilled workers from Asia towards North America is increasing, although
small in comparison with overall migration (OECD, 2001). We do not know of direct evidence
that the mobility of highly educated researchers from other continents has gone up. Evidence
put forward by our interviewees is inconclusive. There is evidence that intra European mobility
of EU residents in general increased substantially over the past five years (OECD, 2000b, part
III) after being roughly constant over the period 1985-1995 (Krueger, 2000). In addition, the
growing expats service industry in the Netherlands provide circumstantial evidence of an 
27 De Volkskrant, ‘Verhuizing expats bloeiende markt’, August 24, 2001.
28 Source: Statistics Netherlands, Buitenlandse werknemers in Nederland.
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increase in high-skilled labour mobility.
27 Still, the level of intra EU mobility seems to be
invariably low (Krueger, 2000): for example, the share of non-Dutch EU residents in Dutch
salaried employment is small (1.6%) and fairly constant over the past decade.
28
Possible trend 4: Emerging R&D activity in emerging markets
Emerging markets, in particular in Asia and Latin-America, demand tailor-made products and
services, which implies a demand for tailor-made R&D to be performed nearby consumers. This
trend suggests a decrease in the relative size of the world's R&D performed in developed
countries, but not an absolute decline. Several of our interviewees confirmed that their firms
increased R&D activity in emerging economies, however not only to cope with local demand for
innovations, but also to serve world markets. The competitiveness of several R&D locations in
developing countries such as Brazil and India is said to be increasing (Albert, 1999). 
Possible trend 5: What matters for an R&D location is to be the best location
The global technology-market race induces multinational enterprises to seek out the unique
centers of excellence (Gassman and Von Zedtwitz, 1999; Meyer-Krahmer and Reger, 1999).
Locations that ‘just keep up' are not good enough anymore; locations have to be best rather than
good. Quality of R&D location factors is more important than the costs (Meyer-Krahmer and
Reger, 1999; Pearce, 1999; Midelfart-Knarvik et al, 2000). However, the trend is unlikely to lead
to one or two hot R&D spots on the globe and a desert everywhere else, since agglomeration of
R&D is bounded by congestion (Fujita et al., 1999; Albert, 1999). A trend of increased
geographical specialization is more likely: a region attracts R&D in a specific field of science and
technology, focussed on a specific type of customer, etcetera. Technology networks (intra firm
and inter firm), alliances and partnering will coordinate geographically dispersed technological
developments (Mytelka, 1993; Gerybadze and Reger, 1999; Albert, 1999; OECD, 1999).
Possible trend 6: Students turn away from science and technology educations and careers
A relatively small share of Dutch students aspires to an R&D job (section 3.3.1). According to
representatives of several established Dutch R&D intensive firms, the inflow expected in the
near future is alarmingly low. Still, they also argued that many competing R&D locations face a
similar problem, suggesting that the relative attractiveness of the Netherlands does not change.
Moreover, AWT (1999) argues that students trade in an education in traditional S&T (e.g.,
chemistry) for a training in new and booming technologies (e.g., life sciences and computer
sciences): the overall demand for S&T training relative to non-technical education is
‘remarkably’ constant. 
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What do these possible trends tell?
If the trends 1 to 5 hold true, then competition for the location of R&D activities will increase.
Trends 1 to 4 suggest that firms face an expanding set of conceivable locations for an R&D
activity, because path dependency of the location of R&D diminishes, because mobility of
researchers increases, and because new location options in emerging economies spring up.
Moreover, if trend 5 holds true, then not only the set of location options expands, but also the
competition between locations grows.
A consequence of increased competition between R&D locations is that the relative importance
of R&D location factors that remain immobile increases (e.g., the quality of universities and
technological institutes and the size and quality of the labour supply of supposedly less mobile
technicians). Moreover, theory argues that such an increase in competition induces regions to
specialise in specific technologies, specific types of R&D, and so on. Specialization in the wrong
type could trap a region into a low-income equilibrium.
Possible trend 6 - substantial shortages of research personnel - will reduce the absolute quality
of the Netherlands as an R&D location. Since many competing locations face a similar trend, it
is not likely that the relative position of the Netherlands will be affected.
3.6 Conclusions
The conclusions from the analysis read as follows:
• History is an important determinant of the location of R&D, since firms choose to start new
R&D operations through co-location, merges and acquisitions, and expansions of existing R&D
facilities. Two other decisive R&D location factors are the supply of qualified researchers in
science and technology and the quality of the public knowledge infrastructure including the
quality of the knowledge transfer channels between science and industry. Location choices are
less driven by costs (e.g., wage costs of R&D personnel).
• A benchmark reveals that the Netherlands takes an average or higher position in a ranking of
OECD countries according to attractiveness to business R&D. The indicators for the size of the
R&D labour force show that the Netherlands lags behind a group of leading countries. The
benchmark is relatively positive on the quality of the Dutch public knowledge infrastructure, but
inconclusive about the quality of the science-industry knowledge transfer.
• It is difficult to gauge whether actual R&D location choices match attractiveness. In any case,
there is no evidence that firms' R&D location decisions are strongly in favour or disfavour to the
Netherlands. 
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• Several trends have been put forward that suggest that competition for the location of R&D
activities will increase. However, the pervasiveness (if not the existence) of the trends is open to
debate. 
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29 See Cameron (1998) and Canton (2001) for surveys of this evidence, and see Atella and Quintieri (2001) for
some critical remarks.
30 CPB (forthcoming) analyses several policy options that may foster the location of R&D in detail.
31 Knowledge spillovers: knowledge transfers for which the recipient does not pay, e.g. transfers through labour
mobility, wining-and-dining, re-invention and imitation of products, and disclosure of information through
patenting. Rent spillovers: inventors do not capture all value their customers derive from the innovation, since
prices are less than customers' willingness to pay. Network spillovers: a firm's innovation is complementary to
another firm's innovation, so both firms may wait for each other's innovations till the cows come home, e.g.
hardware and software in telecommunication. The classic reference for an exposition of different sorts of R&D
spillovers is Griliches (1979).
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4 R&D location and government policy
4.1 Introduction
There is convincing evidence that R&D is a main engine of long-term productivity growth.
29
Market failures, however, hamper the incentives to perform R&D and suggest a role for the
government to select and implement policies that make a country a more attractive location for
R&D. Yet, the opportunity costs of such policy initiatives may be large.
This section presents a general discussion of the social costs and benefits of R&D location policy
rather than an extensive overview and analysis of specific policy instruments.
30 Section 4.2.
explores the rationale for government policy in this field, in particular the interaction between
R&D location and knowledge spillovers. Section 4.3 discusses the sorts of social costs R&D
location policies may involve. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 The social benefits of R&D location policy
R&D market failure
Market failure drives a wedge between private and social returns to R&D. A firm does not take
into account all the benefits and costs that society faces because of its R&D investments. On the
one hand, private incentives to invest in R&D fall short of the social needs for R&D for two
reasons:
• Part of the return to R&D investment accrues to consumers and other firms through knowledge
spillovers, rent spillovers, and network spillovers.
31 
32 An obvious risk is the risk of technical failure of the R&D project. But there are also market related risks. A
competitor may independently produce a superior innovation and capture the market. A competitor may learn
from your (marketing, distribution, technological) mistakes, learn better, and capture the market.
33 In addition, Cooper et al. (2001) argue that if income growth implies a shift in relative preferences from normal
goods towards status goods, then business R&D will be focused on status goods, hence will have a negative
impact on utility growth though a positive impact on economic growth.
34 Beugelsdijk and Cornet (2001) did not find evidence that distance reduces knowledge spillovers within the
Netherlands.
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• R&D is risky, hence risk adverse firms with few opportunities to diversify risks invest less in
R&D.
32 Moreover, R&D requires up-front payments, hence credit- or liquidity constrained firms
face difficulties to invest in R&D.
On the other hand, there are reasons for private incentives to exceed the social incentives:
• New knowledge makes existing markets of other firms dead wood. This is the so-called business
stealing or creative destruction effect.
• Innovation races mean duplication of R&D efforts.
33
The empirical literature shows that, all-in-all, the social returns to R&D exceed the private
returns, even at the current level of public support for innovation (Griliches, 1992; Mohnen,
1996).
Spillovers and geography
R&D spillovers are not evenly spread around the globe. Geography matters. Physical, cultural,
jurisdictional and organizational borders limit the scope for knowledge spillovers. Spillovers
need linkages, and those linkages tend to be more dense when distances are short (see e.g.,
Marshall, 1920; Storper, 1992; Markusen, 1996). Case studies show that physical proximity
plays a key role in the innovative success of regions such as Third Italy, Silicon Valley, and
Baden-Württemberg (Storper, 1993; Saxenian, 1994; Sternberg, 1999). Indeed, the general
finding of the literature is that spillovers become less important as geographical distance
increases (see e.g., Jaffe et al., 1993; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Keller, 1997, 2001; Jacobs et
al., 1999; Branstetter, 2001; Tijssen, 2001; but see also Verspagen, 1997).
34 So we conclude that
R&D spillovers that are bounded by distance motivate national policies that foster R&D in the
domestic economy.
Even though the evidence shows that spillovers are bounded by distance in general, this need
not hold true for specific cases. Some long-distance R&D linkages may be welfare-enhancing
relative to short-distance connections, for example because they are relatively dense or because
they connect the domestic economy with relatively valuable foreign knowledge stocks. Hence, in
some cases, the domestic economy may even benefit from a relocation of domestic R&D activity
to a foreign country.  
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Spillovers of foreign versus domestic R&D
The next question is: does society benefit more or less from foreign direct R&D investments
than from domestic R&D? Differences in social returns between foreign and domestic direct
R&D investments could imply a different policy agenda for foreign R&D. The arguments
include the following:
• Foreign direct R&D opens a linkage between the domestic economy and the knowledge base of
the foreign firm. Domestic firms can benefit from knowledge spillovers, for example through
labour mobility of researchers (Fosfuri et al., 2001). Branstetter (2000), for example, finds
evidence that Japanese FDI in the US has had a positive impact on local US productivity through
knowledge spillovers. Barrell and Pain (1997) find similar evidence for FDI in Germany and the
UK. Keller (2001) finds corresponding evidence for FDI in the G-7 countries. The evidence is
likely to hold for R&D FDI all the more. Knowledge spillovers are unlikely to materialize,
however, if domestic firms lack absorptive capacity or if linkages between domestic firms and
the foreign firms are weak (Blomström and Kokko, 1998).
• New R&D operations and new innovative producers force incumbent, domestic innovators to
enhance their competitiveness. Increased competition presses incumbents to reduce
x-inefficiencies. Increased competition in domestic output markets compel incumbents to be
innovative too. Both effects benefit the domestic economy (Porter, 1990; McKinsey Global
Institute, 1993; Blomström and Kokko, 1998).
• Some innovations beg for complementary innovations that have to be produced in close
interaction with each other. An innovation of a foreign firm tailor-made to local demand may
create a demand for complementary innovations of local, domestic firms. Empirical evidence,
either pro or con, is non-existent (Fosfuri et al., 2001).
• Foreign R&D facilities may crowd out domestic R&D inputs, and compete with innovations of
domestic firms in domestic and foreign markets. This competition reduces the rents domestic
firms enjoy from their innovations. Shareholders of the foreign firm benefit at the expense of
domestic firms. There is evidence that multinationals perform R&D abroad to exploit and
strengthen their knowledge base (Pearce, 1999; Patel and Vega, 1999; Lipsey, 2000), but we are
not aware of evidence that multinationals enter in markets of domestic firms thanks to their
foreign R&D activities.
We are not aware of studies that weigh up the relative pros and cons. We therefore conclude that
we do not know whether foreign direct R&D investments benefit society more or less than
domestic R&D investments.
Spillovers and re-location of R&D
The following box illustrates the case for short and long-distance R&D spillovers with a
hypothetical story of a firm that re-locates an R&D activity to a foreign location. The story first
tells that the loss of short-distance spillovers may be offset by new spillovers that the researchers 
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who were formerly engaged in the re-located activity now generate in their alternative research
jobs. Second, it is argued that the re-location changes the set of long-distance linkages between
the Dutch knowledge infrastructure and those of foreign countries, and that it is difficult to tell a
priori whether this affects Dutch welfare positively or negatively.
Conclusions
There is strong evidence that the social returns to R&D exceed the private returns (even in the
current presence of public support for R&D), and that R&D spillover effects are bounded by
distance. Hence, policies that foster R&D in the domestic economy are legitimate. There is no
evidence that social returns to foreign direct R&D investments are larger or smaller than those
to domestic R&D investments. Hence, there is no evidence that supports R&D policy measures
that discriminate between domestic and foreign direct R&D investment. 
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4.3 The social costs of R&D location policy
The previous section set out the potential benefits of R&D location policy. This section sketches
the sorts of (opportunity) costs of some policy options aimed to make the Netherlands more
attractive to R&D. We restrict ourselves to a discussion of policy options that address two
important R&D location factors (see section 3.2): the size and quality of the R&D labour force
and the quality of the knowledge transfer between science and industry.
The impact of the re-location of R&D activity on R&D spillovers 
Suppose a Dutch multinational firm X decides to move several R&D activities to foreign locations. What will be the
welfare effects for the Dutch economy?
The story starts as follows. Since R&D (knowledge) spillovers are bounded by distance, the social returns of firm
X's relocated R&D activities will not benefit the Dutch economy anymore. However, this loss will be compensated
by the new activities of former R&D employees of firm X. Indeed, these workers tend to stay in their home country,
and they are likely to look for a similar type of job in order to benefit from their specific stock of human capital (that
includes a set of business friends and university contacts). Since R&D personnel is in short supply these days, it
is highly likely that displaced R&D workers will find such a similar job. These jobs will yield spillovers as well. Hence,
the real issue is whether the spillovers associated with the employment alternatives are smaller or larger than those
of the relocated jobs. If relocation of R&D activities implies a shift of the Dutch economy (or the Dutch branch of
multinational X) to R&D activities with even higher social returns, then the Netherlands clearly benefit. If not,
productivity slows down.
But there is more to the story: relocation of R&D affects the set of R&D spillover channels. Indeed, relocation of
some of firm X's R&D activities is likely to open new linkages between the Dutch and the foreign innovation system
or improve upon existing ones. Hence, R&D spillovers previously inhibited by distance now reach the Dutch
economy. Conversely, the foreign country also benefits from better access to the Dutch innovation system. This
could imply more foreign innovations that compete with those of Dutch firms, including firm X, and reduce their
market power. But it also could imply complementary innovations that spur demand for Dutch innovations. Or it
could press firm X and other Dutch firms to be more competitive and innovative to their own benefit.
Hence, we cannot a priori conclude that relocation of some of firm X's R&D activities is good or bad for the Dutch
economy.
Now suppose that a Dutch firm X decides to close its R&D site and to relocate all its R&D activities to a foreign
country. Again, the welfare loss will be compensated by the social returns of the alternative jobs of firm X's former
R&D personnel (partly, fully, or possibly even more than fully). It is unlikely, however, that the Dutch economy will
benefit from firm X's foreign R&D, since firm X now lacks a Dutch R&D site to absorb the R&D spillovers. Moreover,
since new R&D sites tend to pop up infrequently (see section 2), loss of an R&D site is not easily offset by the arrival
of a new one. Hence, closure of an R&D site could decrease the diversity and scope of the Dutch innovation system. 
35 Marey and Borghans (2000) estimate that, in the short run, wage increases capture about 30% of additional
R&D expenditures in the Netherlands. In the long run, the wage gain for incumbent researchers is about 20% of
additional R&D spending. Goolsbee (1998) find similar evidence for the US. Groot et al (1999) find that about 30%
of Dutch high-skilled technical workers favour a non-technical job. AWT (1999) observes that the share of Dutch
students choosing to graduate in science and engineering has been ‘remarkably’ stable over the past 30 year.
Berkhout and Van Leeuwen (2000) find that the share of Dutch students (high school and undergraduate level)
that chooses a non-technical education while considering a technical education a (serious) alternative is very
small. Romer (2000) points at institutional bottlenecks in the US system of higher education that hinder students
to choose the field of study that fits their preferences best. Oosterbeek and Webbink (1997) show that a subtantial
share of female non-tech students is technically talented.
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First, however, we take a small step aside. We did not observe that location factors decisive for
foreign direct R&D investment are not decisive for domestic R&D investments and vice versa
(section 3.2). What is good for foreign direct R&D investments is what is good for domestic
R&D. Hence, policies that improve upon decisive R&D location factors do not discriminate
between foreign and domestic R&D investments. Even if there is a case for differential policy
(and there is no such evidence, see section 4.2), then it would still be impossible to design such
policy as far as the decisive R&D location factors are concerned.
Policies addressing the R&D labour force
Labour supply of the R&D work force may be quite inelastic in the short run but also in the
longer run. There is evidence that it is difficult to induce R&D personnel to work more hours, to
induce workers in non-R&D jobs to switch to an R&D career, and to induce students to favour a
science and engineering education (even though there is a substantial number of female non-
tech students that is technically talented).
35 It might be less difficult to reduce the drop out rate
of students in science and technology (Berkhout and Van Leeuwen, 2000). Furthermore, a
switch towards an R&D education/job involves opportunity costs if the student/worker would
have created positive spillovers in her alternative career in, for example, finance, logistics,
marketing and sales, or (public) management. We are not aware of evidence on the size of those
alternative spillovers. In sum, the effectiveness of policies intended to increase the R&D labour
supply is hampered if the R&D labour supply is inelastic, and the efficiency of such policies is
reduced if additional R&D labour would have creates large social returns in its alternative
employment.
An alternative for ‘more R&D workers' is ‘better R&D workers'. Policies that enhance the
productivity (e.g., absorptive capacity, creativity, entrepreneurship) of scientists and engineers
also raise the effective R&D labour supply. The policy options typically address the educational
sector at all levels (e.g., undergraduate, graduate and post-graduate), but could also aim at
‘life-long learning' activities within business organisations. The benefits of such policies should 
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be offset against the costs, which include the opportunity costs of foregone productivity while
learning.
Policies addressing the public-private knowledge transfer
Improving the transfer of knowledge from universities and technological institutes to the
business sector ranks high on the policy agenda (Schmoch et al, 2000; OECD, 2000a; AWT,
2001a and 2001b; Venniker and Jongbloed, 2001). The policy measures under discussion push
or allow public knowledge organizations to enter the private market for knowledge, foster
scientists to set up new firms, induce public research organisation to claim and exploit
intellectual property rights, and gear the pure science agenda towards the long-term needs of
industry, among others. The possible adverse effect of such initiatives is that a too strong focus
on industry's needs could crowd out the main missions of the public knowledge sector, in
particular the production and broad diffusion of pure and basic science. Hence, policy initiatives
need to balance these pros and cons of stronger incentives to science-industry knowledge
transfer.
Conclusions
The strong rationale for R&D location policy does not necessarily imply that such policy
initiatives are always effective and efficient: the elasticities and the social (opportunity) costs
should be taken into account. For example, increasing the supply of R&D labour could be
difficult, and the opportunity costs of such policy measures are large if the alternative jobs of
additional R&D workers would have generated large social returns. Policy initiatives that raise
the quality of the R&D labour force through learning and education may face opportunity costs
of foregone productivity. Policies that enhance industry-science relationships could divert public
knowledge organisations from their main mission: production and broad dissemination of pure
and basic science.
4.4 Conclusions
Policy that fosters the location of R&D activities in the domestic economy is well-grounded,
since R&D spillover effects are substantial and, moreover, bounded by distance. There is no
evidence that supports policies that differentiate between foreign and domestic direct R&D
investments. The strong rationale for R&D location policy does not necessarily imply that such
policy initiatives are always effective and efficient: policy makers should take into account the
elasticities and the social (opportunity) costs. 
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5 Summary and conclusions
Motivation
Research and development (R&D) is a main engine for productivity growth. Since the social
benefits of R&D tend to be localized, a country's growth engine runs at a higher speed if a given
R&D activity is performed at home instead of abroad, all other things equal. Moreover, since the
social benefits of R&D outweigh the private rewards, the rationale for government policy that
fosters the location of R&D is strong. (Section 4.2)
Setting the stage: the location of R&D in the Netherlands
A handful of large Dutch-based multinational enterprises (MNEs) performs the lion's share of
Dutch business R&D. The remainder is carried out by a small group of mostly multinational
companies, and a substantial number of them is headquartered in foreign countries. Recent
years have seen an increase in R&D activity in the Netherlands, by Dutch and foreign firms
alike. (Section 2.2)
R&D locations do not arrive out of the blue in the Netherlands: greenfield R&D investments are
rare. Generally, new R&D activities are located at established sites close to current activities, i.e.
they are labelled co-location and expansion projects. Once established in the Netherlands, R&D
facilities tend to stay, although the scale of the operations may change over time. This holds both
for Dutch-owned and for foreign-owned firms. Hence, the location of R&D is path-dependent.
(Section 2)
Since the 1980s, a number of Dutch R&D-intensive firms have merged or have been acquired by
foreign enterprises. We did not find evidence that in general new, foreign ownership brought a
considerable change in scale of R&D activity, neither positive nor negative. (Section 2.4)
Some Dutch firms have increased their foreign R&D activities, in relative and absolute terms. In
general, these incremental activities did not affect the size of the R&D operations in the
Netherlands negatively. Other Dutch firms strengthened the role of Dutch R&D sites in the
company's R&D. For example, Philips (by far the largest R&D investor in the Netherlands)
recently started to build a new high tech campus, expanding its main research centre. (Section
2.3)
R&D location factors
The major determinants of the choice of site and size of R&D operations are:
•h i s t o r y
• the supply of qualified researchers in science and technology 
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• the quality of the public knowledge infrastructure including the quality of the science-industry
knowledge transfer channels
R&D location decisions seem to be less driven by the costs of R&D inputs. (Section 3.2)
A benchmark study of R&D location factors (apart from history) shows that the Netherlands
takes an average or higher position in a ranking of OECD countries according to attractiveness
for business R&D. The size of the R&D labour force in the Netherlands lags behind those in a
group of leading countries. The quality of the Dutch public knowledge infrastructure is relatively
high. Indicators are inconclusive about the quality of the science-industry knowledge transfer.
(Section 3.3)
Firms' R&D location decisions are neither very favourable nor very unfavourable to the
Netherlands. (Section 3.4)
Several trends have been put forward that suggest that competition for the location of R&D
activities will increase. Still, the pervasiveness of the trends is open to debate. (Section 3.5)
Policy options
The empirical rationale for government policy that fosters the location of R&D is strong. There
is no evidence that supports differentiated policies towards foreign and domestic direct R&D
investments. (Section 4.2)
However, the strong policy rationale does not necessarily imply that such policy initiatives are
always effective and efficient: the elasticities and the social (opportunity) costs should be taken
into account. For example, increasing the supply of R&D labour could be difficult, at least in the
short run, and the opportunity costs are large if the alternative jobs of the additional R&D
workers would have generated large social returns. Policy initiatives that raise the quality of the
R&D labour force through learning and education may face opportunity costs of foregone
productivity. Policies that enhance industry-science relationships could divert public knowledge
organisations from their main mission: production and broad dissemination of pure and basic
science. (Section 4.3) 
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Abstract
Many factors determine the location of business R&D projects, the most important being
history, the supply of R&D labour, and the quality of the public knowledge infrastructure
(including the science-industry knowledge transfer). The set of R&D locations in the
Netherlands changes little over time. But two things do change regularly: the size of the R&D
activities at a particular site and the name and nationality of the owner of an R&D site. The
Netherlands takes an average or higher position in a ranking of OECD countries according to
attractiveness to the location of business R&D. Since domestic R&D is an important engine for
domestic economic growth and since the market fails to provide optimal incentives for R&D,
there is scope for government policy that improves upon the R&D location climate. Yet, this
policy rationale does not necessarily imply that R&D policy initiatives are always effective and
efficient: elasticities and social (opportunity) costs should be taken into account.
JEL codes: O32, O38, R30
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